China’s 2025 Military Parade: What, Why, History, Comparative Analysis and What Next?
Four Themes: Jointness across Multiple Domains, Conventional and Newer Deterrence, New Type of Militia, and Absolute Party Loyalty
Hello, I sincerely hope you all are doing well! It’s been some time since the last issue.
With roaring engines, hypersonic missiles, and counter-drone swarms, China put its military muscle on full display today at Tiananmen Square. This was the PRC’s first military parade in over five years, timed with the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II, and it came just days after Beijing flexed its diplomatic weight at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit.
I had planned to pause this newsletter until after my admissions cycle in December 2025, as the admissions cycle begins in less than 28 days. Yes, I am counting every day now!! But this parade was too tempting to ignore. Here is a quick yet detailed breakdown of what China wanted to show the world today and why it matters, along with a dash of history.
Index:
Introduction
14 Highlights
More Details
Big Takeaways
Detailed Analysis
Re-watching Checklist
Quick History
Signalling (Beyond Hardware, Domestic and International)
Xi’s Strong Military Thought and The Military Parade
Comparative Analysis: 2019 and 2025 (Change and Constant)
What Next?
Introduction
With much pomp and pageantry, after flexing its diplomatic muscle during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, it was time for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to flex its military muscle on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender. This was the first Chinese military parade in over five years; the last one was on October 1, 2019.
Notable presence at the parade included the Russian President Vladimir Putin, who was already in the mainland for the SCO Summit, North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong Un, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Myanmar’s junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, and more. From Europe, attendance was restricted to Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. Other dignitaries included heads of state of Zimbabwe, Mongolia, Indonesia, and some Central Asian countries. In total, 26 heads of state were present for the military parade.
Notably, India’s two very, very favourite civilian and military leaders, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and “his excellency” Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, were also in attendance.
The previous 2019 parade was remarkable, as the former PLA SSF made its debut, and China’s DF-41, DF-17, and H6-N bombers were displayed in their full glory. The 2019 parade aimed to display Chinese military might with a message intended for both domestic and international audiences. For domestic audiences, the parade evoked a sense of nationalism. It was the time when China’s economy was slowing down, and domestic tensions were rising, especially after the Hong Kong protests. General Secretary Xi Jinping had addressed this issue in his speech during the 2019 parade, where he emphasised long-term stability in Hong Kong and Macao. Internationally, the military parade was directed at the United States and China’s neighbours. It was the time when China and the United States were barely getting started with trade and technology wars under Trump 1.0.
However, it is notable that all this occurred before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the increased coercion by China in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan, the tensions between India and China on the border, the United States’ change of approach towards the South China Sea under Trump 1.0, the Russia-Ukraine War, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the 1965 India-Pakistan War.
Clearly, the world has changed!!! Weapons have improved, and the three major conflicts, especially the India-Pakistan War, have firmly established new warfighting methods.
One notable thing about the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is that it has always learned from others’ wars. Take the Gulf Wars 1 and 2 as concrete examples, and the evolution of Chinese warfare and strategy after that. Thus, these three recent wars/conflicts, especially the India-Pakistan war, would, in my understanding, be a watershed moment in China’s change of approach to its warfare and strategy. Only time will tell (but it definitely merits independent research)! However, at least from the kind of weapons China has chosen to display at the military parade, it is becoming clearer that the PLA is adapting to newer warfare techniques – or at least wants the world to believe that.
So here are some highlights from today’s military parade:
The very well-choreographed military parade spanned approximately 70 minutes, comprising 45 parade formations, including both foot, equipment, and air units.
The order of appearance was the aerial flag escorts, followed by marching formations, followed by flag-bearing ground units, followed by equipment columns, and finally air formations.
The symbolic formations included a blend of outgoing heritage and modernised units, linking veterans of the anti-Japanese war with new-structured units, emphasising Xi’s military reforms.
Since the formation of four strategic services in April 2024, the Space Force, Cyber Force, Information Support Force, and Logistics Support Force, this was the first time their new service flags were displayed in public.
In the meantime, you could refer to my website: www.suyashdesai.com for all 150 newsletters from the past 7 years, all peer-reviewed papers, reports, journal articles, op-eds, podcasts, media appearances, and more! Thank You!
Also available on @suyash_desai on Twitter
Let’s deep-dive into it:
1. Lt Gen Han Shengyan, Air Force Commander of CTC, led the parade.
2. The order of flag-based contingents was as follows: Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Aerospace Force, Cyber Space Force, Information Support Force, Joint Logistics Support Force, Armed Police, NEW TYPE OF MILITIA, Reserve Forces, Militia Formation, and Peacekeeping Force. In this, notice the presence of a new type of militia and reserve forces. This comes straight out of China’s newer mobilisation reforms that it started in 2016, but sped up in 2021 – the NDMO reforms.
3. This was followed by the tank columns, including Type 99 B and Type 100. ZTZ 100 is the PLA’s newer generation tanks, developed mainly by Norinco, mostly to be deployed in the Central, Eastern, and Southern Theatre Commands. They are very, very heavy and not well-suited for Tibet and Xinjiang, but some of them could be deployed in these regions.
4. This was followed by China’s newer next-generation amphibious assault vehicles. The Chinese commentary emphasised the words LANDING OPERATIONS, SECURING THE KEY AREAS, CLEARING THE GROUND, and BEHIND THE ENEMY OPERATIONS. Some of them are newer concepts for the PLA, not discussed in the military textbooks.
5. This was followed by the army’s long-range artillery and the navy’s carrier-based deterrence groupings. Notice the cluster of YJ family (15,17,19, 20) hypersonics and the use of phrases “could be used/fired from air, carrier, and submarine.”
6. This was followed by a plethora of newer early warning radars, anti-aircraft combat the HQ family (19, 20, 29s MRBMs, SAMs, and point missile defence interceptors), very interesting anti-drone warfare family (low and high energy, mircrowave weapons, laser systems like the FK 322 and FK351) (notably, I have repeatedly read these words in PLA Daily since 2020 alongwith WTC, Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts), Information Warfare unit vehicles like XZ 102, XZ121, XZ 124, XZ 134, and XZ 202 (honestly, I am a bit confused with them, I couldn’t locate them), Electronic Countermeasure units (XZ 211, XZ302), Information Support Units (XZ 321, XZ 341), Unmaned Land Combat vehicles which are capable of assault, reconnaissance, bomb disposal and logistic supply, unmanned maritime formation units with underwater, surface, and underwater mines removal vehicles, and unmaned air domination units (helicopters, drones, and planes).
7. Now, notice the use of phrasing in this strategic strike grouping of Cruise and Hypersonic missile families. NAVAL, AIR, and ROCKET FORCES jointly present CJ-20A, YJ-18 C, CJ 1000 (all three CRUISE) and YJ-21, DF-17, DF-26 D (hypersonic) for joint multidomain deterrence!!!! Also, DF-26 was a more conventional/nuclear hot swappable ballistic missile, the last time I checked, also known as the carrier killer in Chinese literature. When did this change happen?
8. Again, notice the use of the language while displaying China’s nuclear might. JL-1, JL-3 (shown for the first time, China’s longest ranged submarine-based ballistic missile), DF-61 (now, what is this? Road Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile? In the mid-1970s, the DF-61 was developed as both a solid-fuel and a liquid-fuel variant of a tactical missile. Chinese media reports that it could range between 12 and 15 thousand kilometres, and DF31 BJ (probably a silo-based version of DF-31). The Chinese commentary was that these forces, together, establish China’s land-sea-air based nuclear deterrence. The nuclear triad. Notice the DF-41’s absence!
9. Finally, there was also the DF-5C, the silo-based ICBM. Reportedly, it has MIRV capabilities and can carry up to 10 independent warheads.
10. In the air column, the much awaited KJ 600 was displayed alongside KJ-500A and J-15C shipborne aircraft.
11. This was followed by J-16 fighters and Y-20 versions of China’s logistics aircraft.
12. In the bomber sections, notice H6 N, H6 K and H6 J versions. NO H-20 advanced stealth bomber.
13. Furthermore, J-20s and its different versions made debut (although J-20 has appeared before, but not other variants of J-20s in the military parade), so did J-35A, alongside J-16 D.
14. Finally, the carrier-based J-15H, J15 D and J35s also flew past the post. The language used was from ski-jump technology to catapult technology; China’s military modernisation is at its full glory.
Some More Details
Surface / Subsurface & Missiles
• AJX002 XLUUV: Built by China State Shipbuilding Group. About 18–20 m in length, pump-jet propulsion, conventionally powered.
• Large USV: Likely developed by CSSC 716/702 Institutes. Among the largest unmanned surface vessels ever seen in China.
• Missile TELs: Manufacturer undisclosed.
Armour / Artillery
• “LZ” Medium Tank (new): Likely Norinco. 105 mm gun, low-profile/unmanned-style turret, phased-array panels, APS, counter-drone kit.
• ZTL-11 Wheeled Assault Gun: Norinco. 8×8 chassis, 105 mm gun, automatic loader.
• PHL-191/PHL-16 MLRS: Norinco. The modular launcher can fire 370 mm guided rockets or tactical missiles.
• Type 99A MBT: Norinco. 125 mm smoothbore gun, 1500 hp engine, composite/ERA armour.
• FK-3000 C-UAS / SHORAD: Norinco. 6×6 chassis, AESA radar, EO sensors, 96 ready-to-fire small interceptors. THIS IS CHINA’S ADVANCED ANTI-DRONE LAYERED SYSTEM.
Air Echelon
• KJ-500 AEW&C: Shaanxi Aircraft Corp. Tri-sided AESA radar dome, medium-range early warning.
• J-15: Shenyang Aircraft Corp. Carrier fighter, twin-engine.
• J-35 (5th-gen carrier fighter): Shenyang Aircraft Corp. Stealth carrier/land variant.
• J-20A / J-20S (twin-seat): Chengdu Aircraft Corp. Stealth fighter.
• J-10C: Chengdu Aircraft Corp. 4++ gen multi-role.
• Y-20 & H-6 with AAR scene: Xi’an Aircraft Corp. Strategic transport and bomber.
• KJ-600 (first public showing): Carrier AEW, new CATOBAR platform.
BIG TAKEAWAYS
1) Clear emphasis on displaying jointness across multiple domains and verticals.
2) Serious attempt to display not only conventional deterrence but also deterrence across newer spheres and verticals (space, cyber, electromagnetic, networks, etc.).
3) Inclusion of a New Type of Militia is indicative of emphasis on military mobilisation since 2022.
4) All slogans (salute your commander, follow the party command, fight to win, follow exemplary conduct, hail your comrade) scream that the Party Commands the Gun!
5) Xi’s two important messages, one for the West and one for the PLA. For the West, “All countries are to be treated equally, the Chinese nation will not be bullied, and China chooses peace over war and cooperation over a zero-sum game.” For the PLA, “perform your duty, abide by the party, and build a world-class force.”
Detailed Analysis
1) Deterrence across domains, especially newer verticals: The emphasis of this parade was on displaying advanced equipment like hypersonic strike missiles, anti-ship/aerospace denial tools, and autonomous systems. This equipment is pitched as tools to defeat intervention from outsiders (around Taiwan and the Western Pacific).
2) Modular joint kill-chains: Parade formations are deliberately intended to display system-of-systems operations and mixed echelons (air/ground and other verticals) to message networked joint ops. For instance, mixed formations of fighters, drone swarms, and EW support units displaying the program to act within a larger kill chain are all examples of modular, system-of-system formations. Please note that these are some very important concepts from the PLA vocabulary (system of system operations, operational system, system confrontation, informatised warfare, intelligentized warfare, non-contact warfare, three warfare (which I think should be six warfare now), integrated multidomain joint operations, seizing information dominance, and more).
3) Homegrown weaponry: This might sound casual due to the massive expanse of the Chinese equipment industry, but the parade organisers have repeatedly stressed “现役主战装备，全部是国产、自主研发,” meaning, all current leading combat equipment on display is homegrown and independently developed. This is not just about pride, but it also means that, in contrast to the 1980s–90s, when the PLA was still importing or reverse-engineering Soviet/Russian Su-27s, Kilo submarines, and buying Israeli/Western electronics, it has reached a very high percentage of induction of homegrown equipment. In fact, this would be a fascinating comparative case study to find out what percentage of the PLA equipment being inducted into service is homegrown. I think it should be at least around 85 to 90 percent. Another important message from this is that Beijing is signalling it can withstand Western tech denial (post-Ukraine war, US export controls, etc.). Finally, it is about nationalism, “中国人的饭碗要牢牢端在自己手里” Xi’s message that the “Chinese rice bowls must be firmly in Chinese hands”) applies to the weapons industry too.
4) Furthermore, the official framing of the SCO summit and the PLA’s military flexing also includes reworking the “correct WWII narrative,” asserting China’s role in building/defending the post-war order. This is presented as a moral authority for China’s current security posture.
5) Xi will host the largest foreign-leader turnout at a Chinese parade since 2015. I remember watching the 2019 military parade, and I don’t think any foreign dignitaries attended that parade. The SCO summit and now the military parade visually displayed an emerging counter-US alignment and a tighter nexus among authoritarian powers.
6) Deterrence using newer tools: Newer-type forces focusing on 高超 gao chao hypersonic, 无人 wu ren unmanned, 反无人 fan wuren counter unmanned、网电攻防 wang dian gong fang network-electronic offence-defence, 战略重器 zhanlue zhongqi strategic heavy equipment or strategic deterrence were on display this. I am personally fascinated by the emphasis on counter-unmanned equipment in the military parade. Clearly, the PLA has been observing and learning from the three recent conflicts and wars. The display of loyal-wingman/CCA-type drones (e.g., FH-97-class) along with jammers, sensors, and hard-kill elements also showcases China’s layered and evolving drone warfare capabilities. The PLA textbooks repeatedly have started using distinctions like Soft-kill (EW jammers, spoofers, GPS denial, radio-frequency interference, directed-energy (laser) systems to blind optics or fry circuits), Hard-kill (Short-range missiles, rapid-fire guns, anti-drone drones, Net-launchers, intercept UAVs) and Layered defence (Integrating tactical (platoon/company) level jammers up to strategic air defence grids).
7) Hypersonic & high-end strike: Of course, the DF family, especially 17s, 26s, 61, 31 and advanced anti-ship missiles like YJ-21s, which are already in service with the PLA, were eye-catching elements of the parade.
8) EW / cyber / space support/ Logistics forces: This was the first time since the dismantling of the PLA SSF and formation of these smaller sub-forces that they were publicly displayed.
One let down for me was that I personally was curious to see the H-20 advanced strategic bomber. However, the bomber is still in its testing phase, or the PLA intentionally chose not to display it.
Rewatching Checklist
I would most certainly rewatch this parade, and here is my checklist while rewatching it:
1. Understanding the Air modules' pairings of AEW&C.
2. Hypersonic/anti-ship carts: Any tweaks in canister sizes/launch vehicles for DF series that hint at range/kill-chain evolution.
3. Counter-drone kit: New EW vehicles, sensors, or hard-kill launchers in “反无人” groupings.
4. Mobilisation optics: How the militia formation is costumed and narrated (coastal defence? Emergency support? Cyber reserves?). Also, what is this new type militia.
5. Dais optics: Seating/order of foreign leaders and whether side meetings are publicised.
Quick History of Chinese Military Parades
1) 1949: Founding of PRC: First Tiananmen parade, CCP–PLA legitimacy.
2) From 1950 to 1959: Annual military parades: Showcased Soviet supplied equipment and China’s early defence industry.
3) 23 years of hiatus from 1960 to 1983 due to austerity, the Cultural Revolution, and its aftereffects.
4) 1984 (35th Anniversary): First major parade after 24 years. General Secretary Deng Xiaoping used it to symbolise PLA modernisation and the legitimacy of Reform and Opening. This parade included militia women and modernised ground forces.
5) 1999 (50th Anniversary): After 1989 crackdown + 1990s unrest, this parade projected stability. The highlight of this parade was that it showcased missile forces (Second Artillery), the beginnings of informatization, and economic-military confidence.
6) 2009 (60th Anniversary): This parade was the centerpiece of Hu Jintao’s “Peaceful Rise.” It was the first time that C4ISR systems, precision strike, modern tanks/artillery, and improved joint-service structure were on display. Perhaps this was the early indicator of China moving away from the “hide capabilities and bide time” philosophy, 韬光养晦 tao guang yang hui.
A new template has been formed since Xi took charge:
2015 (Beijing): Commemorated the 70th Anniversary of the WWII victory.
- 17 foreign contingents invited.
- Xi announced 300,000 troop cuts.
- Framed as “memory diplomacy” + anti-Japan legitimacy.
2017 (Zhurihe, Inner Mongolia): China’s first field parade since 1981, at a training base.
- Showed combat realism (camouflage, desert environment).
- Stressed absolute Party control.
2018 South China Sea Naval Review): Largest-ever PLAN review.
- 48 vessels, 76 aircraft, 10,000 personnel
- Demonstrated China’s blue-water ambitions and maritime sovereignty claims.
2019 (70th Anniversary): One of the biggest parades in PRC history.
- Debut of DF-17 hypersonic, DF-41 ICBM, JL-2/SLBM carriers, WZ-8 drone.
- Narrative: China had entered “new-quality” warfare, systems-of-systems, joint kill chains.
Messaging from the Military Parade This Year
1) Message Beyond Hardware:
A significant highlight of this parade, alongside the hardware display, is the political control: cadres, slogans, and Party loyalty themes that dominate the staging, commentary, and other aspects. It is very, very apparent if you hear the parade in the Chinese language and not on CGTN English.
As discussed earlier, the emphasis on counter-unmanned (反无人) systems can be linked to lessons learned by the PLA from the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and India-Pakistan. I would keep an eye on this section from the next defense white paper, which is long overdue, including the science of military strategy, NDU, and NUDT commentaries, etc.
One thing that fascinated me is the showcase of contest and contrast between “traditional deterrence” (ICBMs, tanks, long columns) and deterrence using newer forces, such as “new-type forces” (AI drones, cyber, space, and electronic warfare).
Since 2021, I have been shouting (writing) at every opportunity possible that changing military mobilisation patterns within the Chinese PLA (mobilisation is an umbrella term for a lot of new things happening with the PLA and other related Chinese forces) is one of the most significant areas of reform. It is now also apparent from this military parade.
2) Domestic Signalling:
Party Controls the Gun: Xi Jinping’s inspection of troops and the repeated slogans of absolute Party leadership over the PLA reinforce the message that the gun is firmly under Party control. This is especially important in the post-2015 reform era, where corruption purges and loyalty checks remain central to governance. Controlled and choreographed slogans during the parade, like 听党指挥, 能打胜仗, 作风优良 (Follow the Party’s command, fight to win, maintain acceptable conduct), are the most direct embodiment of reinforcing absolute Party control.
Mass Mobilisation Spirit: The inclusion of newer militia formations, veterans, and even civilian representatives in supporting roles highlights the message that “every citizen is a soldier” (全民皆兵). This ties into the National Defence Mobilisation reforms.
Youth & Education Campaigns: Heavily televised parades target younger generations, encouraging pride in the PLA and recruitment interest. As I have always maintained, beyond peace disease, the PLA also suffers from a demand-supply problem, where the supply of qualified troops to man advanced equipment never matches demand.
National Cohesion During Uncertainty: At a time of slowing growth and local discontent, the parade serves as a rallying point, demonstrating that while China faces domestic challenges, it remains a strong and secure military power.
Technological Self-Reliance: A focus on indigenous equipment (homegrown UAVs, EW systems, missiles) signals that, despite Western tech restrictions, China can innovate and defend itself relentlessly.
3) International Signalling
Message to the United States: By showcasing hypersonic missiles, space/counter-space systems, and cyber-electronic warfare, the PLA aims to demonstrate its capability not just to deter but also threaten the US systems in the region in case of any US “misadventure.”
Message to Taiwan: Loyal-wingman drones, amphibious assault vehicles, and airborne assault formations signal the credibility of invasion, joint strike, and blockade operations. However, I don’t understand how much more psychological pressure can be applied on Taiwan, as it is already facing coercion daily, and has had five or six exercises around the island. I was in Taiwan during all these exercises (now, I have moved back to Mumbai to prepare for the upcoming admission cycle), and locals really don’t care about what China is doing. Only foreigners were going GAGA over the missiles that were fired over Taiwan. Honestly, locals didn’t even know what was happening around them.
Message to India: Yes, despite the “great reproachment,” there are messages for the Indian security establishment. The presence of long-range artillery, UAV brigades, and high-altitude equipment is intended to remind India of the PLA’s modernisation of its Western Theatre Commands. It plays into border signalling, and now, coupled with China’s improved border infrastructure and newer mobilisation techniques, China can quickly escalate if and when required.
Message to South China Sea Countries: Displaying naval assets, anti-ship systems, and unmanned surveillance drones signals dominance in the South China Sea. It is meant to warn ASEAN states that China’s presence is permanent and potent.
Message to the Global South: Beyond deterrence and compellence, the parade serves as a branding exercise for China's advanced weapons, as the PRC presents itself as a leader of a new security order, offering advanced and relatively affordable military technology to its customers in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East. Notably, despite India doing very, very well against China’s weapons, which it sells to Pakistan, the narrative with the rest of the world was shocking. I was in Taiwan during India’s Operation Sindoor, and the kind of things I heard not only in English media but also on Chinese media were shocking. Now, as facts emerge, we get to know the real power of the narrative warfare.
Ambiguity & Deterrence: Honestly, this is one thing I love about Chinese equipment and messaging. Some systems are displayed without full explanation, creating uncertainty and leading to ambiguity. This ambiguity is deliberate; it forces adversaries to plan against worst-case scenarios, thereby stretching their resources. Furthermore, the intentional absence of specific systems (e.g., H-20 bombers) could suggest either strategic secrecy or resource prioritization.
Xi's Strong Military Thought and the Military Parade
Finally, as in the past, the link between "Xi Jinping's Strong Military Thought" and the Military Parade was apparent. Military parades under Xi Jinping have become both ideological performances and strategic demonstrations.
Five essential points from Xi's Military Thought are:
1) Absolute Party Leadership over the PLA
2) Combat Effectiveness
3) Modernisation: Mechanisation, Informatisation, and forming a World Class Force
4) Integrated Multidomain Joint Operations
5) Military Civil Fusion
6) Reforms and Discipline
These were very well reflected, reinforced and reiterated in the military parade.
Comparative Analysis 2019 and 2025: What has Changed and What has Remained Constant?
What has Changed?
1. New Strategic Systems unveiled the DF-61 ICBM and DF-31BJ, expanding nuclear deterrence; 2019’s highlight was the DF-41, which was absent this time.
2. Unmanned & Counter-Unmanned: 2025 emphasised loyal wingman drones, counter-drone gear, and unmanned amphibious vehicles, absent in 2019. Honestly, this was the highlight of the 2025 parade.
3. Naval/Carrier Focus: 2025 hinted at J-35 naval stealth fighters linked to the Fujian carrier, showing a maritime shift beyond the J-20-centric 2019 air segment.
What has remained Constant?
1. Nuclear Signalling: Both parades centred on ICBMs as strategic deterrence, showcasing survivable road-mobile launchers.
2. Civil-Military Fusion: Each event highlighted “strategic heavy equipment” to project technological and national power for domestic legitimacy.
3. Multi-Domain Messaging: Both stressed land-sea-air integration and sent deterrent signals to the United States, Taiwan, India, and regional audiences. However, this is much more emphasised in 2025 than in 2019.
So, What Next?
In this dramatic display of China’s military might, every column, chant, and missile canister carried Xi’s Strong Military Thought: Loyalty to the Party, combat effectiveness, modernisation, joint operations, and self-reliance.
Yet, beyond the slogans, one theme stood out for me: Counter-unmanned warfare. If the Gulf Wars were China’s wake-up call for informatisation, then the Ukraine, Gaza, and India-Pakistan wars and conflicts may be its wake-up call for the drone age or something else; only time will tell.