India-China Border Dispute, Problems within the PLA, Taiwan, Modernisation, PLA Scholars on Coastguards, Joint Operation Command Centre, Military Vocabulary
Hello,
真的好久不見！
祝您們中秋節快樂!!!
Wishing you all a very happy Mid-Autumn Festival from Taiwan.
I hope all of you are doing well.
It has been almost six months since I last wrote this newsletter. Many of you have emailed me enquiring about the newsletter. I sincerely apologise for the gap and admit that studying Chinese kept me extremely occupied. It is a very difficult and time consuming language.
Some Personal Update: As all of you are aware, for the past 18 months, I have been studying Chinese at the National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. I am thrilled to share that I completed studying level B2 (equivalent to HSK 6) in Kaohsiung. And now, I have moved to Taipei’s National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU) to study at higher levels.
As always, I am happy to share the latest edition of the PLA Bulletin: A newsletter on news, analysis, updates and academic writing about the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
Please note that it’s a very long newsletter and might be folded into the email. So, it’s best to open it in the browser by clicking on the logo.
A sincere thank you for reading the newsletter, I hope you enjoy reading it and find it insightful.
Please take care and stay safe,
Suyash Ashok Desai.
(Taipei, Taiwan)
Index
India-China Border Dispute
Problems within the PLA
Taiwan and China
PLA Modernisation: Joint Operation Command Centre, Increased Activities at Nuclear Test Sites, New Helmets
Research: PLA Scholars on Coastguards, Nuclear, War Games, Diversionary War
Other News and Updates
Chinese Military Vocabulary
Section 1: India-China Border Dispute
It has been over three years since the deadly Galwan clash of June 15-16 marked a watershed in India-China ties. The Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in deadly hand-to-hand combat in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh in the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese troops. In the past 40 months since the clash, the entire India-China border has witnessed increased troops strength, induction of armour and mechanised capabilities in the near rear, creation of newer border infrastructure, increased air and surveillance capabilities, and occasional stand-offs in different sectors (Tawang lately). In August 2023, both sides engaged in the 19th round of Corps Commander-level meetings at the Chushul border meeting point with no breakthrough. As things stand today, through patient negotiation, the two sides managed to disengage in four of the six points — Galwan, Pangong Tso, Gogra Post, and near Jianan Pass (PP15) Hotsprings. However, the Depsang Bulge and the Charding Ninglung Junction in the Demchok area are the two key areas that remain unsettled.
Meanwhile, in August 2023, China’s Ministry of Natural Resource released the 2023 edition of its standard maps as a part of its annual exercise. There certainly are questions regarding the release timing during the East Asia Summit and just a week before the G20 was to be held. The map shows India’s north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of China’s South Tibet and the Aksai-Chin plateau as a part of the PRC (It has also outraged its other neighbors like the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, and Russia. More of that in the subsequent sections.) Although multiple countries, including India, protested with China, however, this is not the first time China has done this, and I could think of the map that China published in 2016 also having similar territories marked under its jurisdiction, including the 10th dash and parts of Black Bear Island.
Elsewhere, in the last couple of months, China has continued issuing staple visas to athletes from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir participating in the World University Games in Chengdu. Again, China has been engaging in such practices since 2010 when Lieutenant General B S Jaswal, then the Northern Army commander, was issued a stapled visa by the Chinese embassy in New Delhi on the ground that he commanded a “disputed territory (Jammu and Kashmir).” He was visiting China to participate in a defence exchange program. For more details on this, I would encourage you to refer to Dr Ketiang Zhang’s work in general and her journal article titled Explaining Chinese Military Coercion in Sino-Indian Border Disputes.
Meanwhile, 60 km east of Depsang Plains, where the issue is still unresolved, satellite images reveal that the Chinese troops have begun constructing tunnels and shafts into the hillside along the narrow river valley to construct multiple reinforced shelters and bunkers for solid weaponry. This is an emerging trend in Tibet as weapons depots and equipment and logistics facilities were first created in four major Tibetan cities between 2018 and 2020, and now, in the past two years, it’s slowly happening closer and closer to the border areas.
Some Developments from Tibet and PLA’s Western Theatre Command
New Construction
Earlier this year, China constructed two new runways at the Changdu Bangda Airport in Tibet (Nyingchi) near the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh. However, more importantly, some areas have been cleared at this airport for possible UAV basing. The area that has been cleared is approximately 100 meters wide and 275 meters in length. It is next to the hangers and very close to the inflatable hangers. As per the information available dated June 3, 2023, there were no UAVs at this base. However, as the photos below indicate, previously, there was a presence of J11 aircraft and UAVs, including the WZ series and CH-4 series. Please note that this is not a dual-use airbase, unlike some other airports in Tibet.
Similarly, satellite images also highlight that Nyingchi-Mainling Airport, which is just 15 km from the Indian border near Arunachal Pradesh, which is also considered one of the critical hubs for the PLA operations in the east, is now armed with three WZ-7 high altitude long endurance UAVs. These Guizhou WZ-7 Drones, which were located at the Mainling airport, are primarily designed for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. But after refitting, its missions can be expanded to providing targeting data for anti-ship ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Guigala Tunnel Constructed After 7 Years of Work
Similarly, China has also completed the Guigala Tunnel of the Tibet S5 line on the Lhasa-Zedang Expressway, which was finally inaugurated in the last week of June 2023. The construction went on for seven years, and the Tibetan authorities have described this tunnel as one of the most challenging construction projects in the recent times. It connects Lhasa to Shannan on the road that connects Lhasa to G349 (G349 further takes a right turn and is the only major highway that heads towards Tawang from Lhasa).
After completing this project, Lhasa to Shannan journey is shortened by an hour, which also means that the journey from Lhasa to Tawang is shortened by an hour. Lhasa and Shannan are two major PLA centres for the Tibet Military District, where major backup forces are based. The PLA’s doctrinal text (Science of Military Strategy and Science of Second Artillery Campaign) emphasises the importance of backup forces from the nearest locations to help the border troops with countermeasures. Lhasa and Shannan are the nearest major locations from Tawang, and the S5 line, on which this tunnel is constructed, along with G349, will be the most important route for mobilisation of troops in case of an escalation near Tawang. That is why, most likely, the Tibetan authorities have invested so much time and money in this tunnel.
Details of the tunnel: The tunnel's entrance is 4248 meters above sea level, and the exit is 4117 meters above sea level. The tunnel's left tunnel is 12.79 km long, and the right tunnel is 12.78 km long.
Long Spears on the LAC
In the last newsletter that I wrote in April during the Peace Memorial Day Holidays, I noted that the PLA had ordered long Maces and Combined Maces for its troops on the India-China border. The PLA has commissioned these long spear blades on the LAC. These orders were placed in February 2023 and were to be delivered to the location by April-May 2023. Recently, there were reports that these long spears were seen on the LAC. It was reported on some Chinese sites, and these articles were withdrawn. These websites noted that these are sharpened steel pipes and a cut at one end resembling an ancient spear. The stainless steel pipes are extremely long and hard and can be used for piercing and thrown like a javelin.
This is the screenshot:
Furthermore, according to the newly released photos, the PLA practiced new combat tactics with these sticks on the border. The small troops of the PLA were performing a "Roman phalanx" formation, blocking the opponent's first wave of offensive with shields and then using sharpened strips of hollow steel pipes to attack. Previously, the PLA has used maces, guan dao (Chinese pole weapon), and spike sticks. But, there were some shortcomings that the PLA noticed. The Guan Dao was not long, sharp enough, and heavy. The PLA soldiers complained that at such high altitudes, it is difficult to swing the guan dao neatly. Furthermore, although the old mace that the PLA used looks ferocious and is powerful in close combat, if the opponent (India) uses barbed wire to separate the distance, the mace is too short to attack the opponent. That’s why this change!
WTC commission’s at least 2-3 Y-9 aircraft
The PLA’s WTC has commissioned 2-3 Y-9 aircraft in June 2023. Y-9 is a medium military transport aircraft that has been fully operating since 2017. It is designed for 25-30 tonne cargo and can carry two para-droppable ZBD-03 airborne combat vehicles as well as various other military equipment such as light trucks, cargo containers, or pallets. The PLA has over 30 units of Y-9 aircraft (operational or in the manufacturing process). These 2 to 3 Y-9s will be deployed with the WTC’s Air Force 6th Transport Search and Rescue Regiment, most likely at Yuzhong Airfield.
Tibet Work Report
Meanwhile, the People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region published its annual work report earlier this year. Generally, the provincial work reports are published along with the national work report in March. However, this year, the Tibet work report was delayed (at least uploading on the website) by 2-3 months. Here are the key takeaways from the report.
The Tibet government worked on 46 road projects, which include PAI-MO highway (connecting Pai Town, Milin County, Nyingchi City, Tibet Autonomous Region, and ends at Beibeng Township, Motuo County.) It was started in 2008 and completed in 2022. All these towns are very close to the Indian border near Arunachal Pradesh.
Longzi and Tingri Airports were completed and opened to navigation, again very close to the border.
The PRC introduced 18 preferential policies for border settlements (this means 18 policies were introduced, which provided incentives for the Han Chinese and Tibetans to settle in the newly formed border villages).
624 well-off border villages have been established earlier, the registered border population has increased by 10.5%, and the mileage of border defense roads has increased by 3.7 times.
What are the big-ticket items for 2023?
The Tibet government plans to connect the new land-sea channel in the west of the country (this is very ambiguous; in my understanding, it has something to do with Pakistan; otherwise, I cannot think of any land-sea channel to Tibet).
The Tibet government is working on 151 infrastructure projects, which are financially supported by the national "14th Five-Year Plan." These include the big ones like the rest of the section of the Sichuan-Tibet Railway and accelerate the electrification of the Lari Highway, the Shiquanhe Town-Kunsha Airport Expressway, the Gela section of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, etc. But this also includes improving the border infrastructure by accelerating the construction of water source projects at border resettlement points, implementing the renewal project of municipal facilities in border towns, strengthening the construction of roads connecting each of these border villages and towns to regional public service centers with feeder roads, etc.
Elsewhere, Nagari Prefecture holds 2023 Cyber Security Training
This information was posted on the website of the Ngari Ali municipal government. The website claims to further promote the steady development of network security and informatisation construction in the Ali region, accelerate the promotion of network security work in the whole region, and prevent and reduce network security accidents. The training mainly focused on basic knowledge of network security, national laws and regulations, the current situation of network security, security awareness education, security protection capabilities, and typical network security cases.
Probably the Second PLA Naval Base in the Indian Ocean Region
Recent Aerial photos of the PLA’s latest overseas Realm Base, Cambodia, show it is near completion. The Ream Base is located in Sihanoukville, Sihanoukville Province, Southwest of Cambodia, facing the Gulf of Thailand, close to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. It is considered to be China’s foothold in the South China Sea and even allows the Chinese military to cover important seas connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
The latest satellite pictures note that the pier for the base might even be capable of anchoring aircraft carriers. There is no confirmation yet if it could park the Chinese submarines, as the submarine parking requires different capabilities. However, parking every other naval vessel is possible if the pier is capable of anchoring aircraft carriers.
Until 2022, China was rejecting any claims regarding a naval base. However, in 2022, the Chinese side sent an ambassador to Cambodia to attend the groundbreaking ceremony to upgrade the Ream base.
Base in 2021
Base in 2023
Read More
Check the inaugural episode of Global India podcast, hosted by Dr Tanvi Madan. This episode features Amb Vijay Gokhale and Amb Shivshankar Menon.
Section 2: Problems within the PLA
In the past few months, several Chinese Generals have disappeared from the public view. This includes China’s Defence Minister and the senior staff of the PLA Rocket Force. These disappearances were surprising as under Xi Jinping, the PLA had multiple rounds of anti-corruption crackdown, and it was believed that the current brass of the PLA leadership is completely Xi loyalists.
What happened?
1. Wu Guohua (吴国华), deputy commander of the CCP’s Rocket Force, allegedly committed suicide on July 6, 2023.
2. Li Yuchao (李玉超), commander of Rocket Force, taken away during a meeting on June 26, 2023.
3. Wei Fenghe (魏凤和), former commander of Rocket Force, and former Minister of National Defense, under investigation.
4. Zhang Zhenzhong (张振中), former deputy commander of the Rocket Force and current Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission Joint Staff Department, under investigation.
5. Liu Guangbin (刘光斌), deputy commander of the Rocket Force, under investigation.
6. Li Shangfu, China’s Defence Minister, under investigation.
7. After the purge of the leadership of the Rocket Force, there were also rumours about a purge of the PLA SSF, especially Gen Shang Hong (尚宏), the deputy commander of the Strategic Support Force and the commander of the Space Force. However, this cannot be verified!
Some Speculation
Corruption is a plausible explanation for the PLARF leadership shakeup. Corruption has long been a serious problem within the PLA, especially during the “reform and opening up” period. Rooting out corruption has thus been one of the major goals of Xi’s military reforms.
In late July, the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission released a statement announcing that it was gathering evidence about corruption in procurement and bidding and leaks of classified information.
From 2012 through 2022, China’s official defense spending doubled from 670 billion to 1.45 trillion renminbi (roughly $106 billion to $230 billion). Roughly 40 percent of this was allocated to the procurement budget. Additionally, it is unclear if China’s nuclear modernisation, its recent silo constructions, and its advanced submarine programmes are funded out of this budget or somewhere else. These lavish expenses probably allowed individuals from the Rocket Force and the equipment department to profit. Dr. Joel Wuthnow’s recent article in Foreign Affairs claims, “Recent cases only deepen suspicions that the PLA might be hiding other defects, including in critical equipment purchased over the last decade.” Thus, corruption in the PLA could be one primary reason for the recent purge.
Another theory that was speculated on the Chinese internet was a leak of information. In 2022, an American think tank released a report on the CCP Rocket Force. The report is almost 300 pages long and highly detailed on the organisational structure of the Rocket Force. So, there were speculations on Chinese social media that there was a leak of information from the PLA RF to the West.
Another interesting theory from the Chinese social media was an attempt to establish a link to the Russian Wagner Group, especially after its attempted rebellion.
However, I think this purge had more to do with the existing corruption issues within the PLA. Check this podcast by Bonnie Glaser with Dr. Phillip Saunders on the Shakeup in the PLA Rocket Force.
New Appointments
On July 31, a day before the PLA Day, the CCP appointed Admiral Wang Houbin from the PLA Navy and General Xu Xisheng from the Air Force as the new Commander and Political Commissar of the PLA RF. The Commissar appointment is not unusual, as the PLA has a history of appointing Commissars across services and theatres. However, the Commander-level appointment is certainly unusual. This appointment sparked new questions, like how admirals and generals from the Navy could take over the Rocket Force. Will that affect PLA RF’s morale and combat effectiveness? Is the Commander acquainted with the workings of the PLA RF?
One interesting thing to note is that Admiral Wang Houbin was the Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet from January 2016 until 2018. So he was responsible for the PLA’s Yulin Naval Base, Hainan Island, where most of China’s SSBNs and SSNs are based. So, this could be some qualification besides loyalty for appointing him as the Commander of the PLA RF.
Admiral Wang Houbin
In July 2023, he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed Commander of the Rocket Force. On December 12, 2019, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. In December 2014, he was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral.
In April 2018, he was promoted to the Naval Headquarters and served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy. Later, in December 2018, he was promoted to Deputy Commander of the Navy.
In January 2016, he served as Chief of Staff of the Navy's South China Sea Fleet.
He joined the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1979 and served as Director of the Comprehensive Research Office of the General Staff Office, Deputy Chief of East China Sea Fleet staff, and Deputy Commander of the Zhoushan Base.
General Xu Xisheng
He once served as Political Commissar of the Fuzhou Command Post of the PLA Air Force, Director of the Air Force Political Department of the Beijing Military Region, and Director of the Air Force Political Work Department of the Central Theatre Command.
In 2017, he served as Deputy Political Commissar of the Southern Theatre and Political Commissar of the Theatre Air Force.
On February 24, 2018, he was elected to represent the 13th National People's Congress. In July 2018, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. He is also a Member of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In July 2023, he was promoted to the rank of General and served as Political Commissar of the Rocket Force.
Some other new appointments: Political Commissars
Admiral Liu Qingsong is the Political Commissar of ETC
At the time of the appointment, he was the Political Commissar of the NTC.
Before that, he was the Political Commissar of the Navy, ETC, and Deputy Political Commissar of ETC
Before that, he was the Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Air Force
In 2016, he was Director of the Political Work Department at Northern Theatre Air Force
Previously, he was also a Deputy Director of the Guangzhou military region Air Force Political Department
Currently a member of the 20th Central Committee
Was promoted as a General in 2022 January
General Zheng Xuan is promoted to the Political Commissar of NTC
At the time of appointment, he was the Political Commissar of the Northern Theatre Command – Army.
Before that, he was the Director of the Political Work Department, Central Theatre Command.
Previously, he was the Political Commissar of the 13th Group Army and the Political Commissar of the Tibet Military Region.
He has also served as the Political Commissar of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade of the Fourteenth Group Army, Chengdu Military Region.
He was promoted to the rank of General in June 2023.
Read More on Xi’s Personnel Mismanagement.
Section 3: Taiwan and China
Recent Chinese movements around Taiwan were “abnormal.” This is what Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正), said recently, flagging China’s recent amphibious exercises and its record incursions in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Taiwan’s defence ministry had sounded alarm bells on September 18th, when a record 103 PLA warplanes operated near the island, warning such activities would only further escalate cross-strait tensions and destabilise regional security. The ministry said it had tracked 103 PLA aircraft in the 24 hours, with 40 crossing the de facto median line in the Taiwan Strait or entering the island’s ADIZ in the southwest and southeast. In the same week, 20 Chinese warships were spotted in waters around Taiwan.
In August 2023, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command conducted joint sea and air combat readiness patrols and joint exercises around Taiwan. This is the second time the PLA has launched large-scale military exercises around the Taiwan Strait since April. Since September 2020, especially after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, Beijing has launched large-sortie incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ and across the Median Line as a new normal. This also includes occasionally firing ballistic missiles over the island and conducting “encircling” drills around the island. However, from April this year, military drills such as “Joint Blockade,” “Island Lockout,” and “Combat Readiness Patrol” were launched, and large-scale joint exercises were carried out just a few hours after they were announced. This indicates the strengthening of PLA’s preparations for a “sudden assault” and “first and decisive battle” to attack Taiwan by force, rather than just “intention” or “deterrence.” Ke Yongsen, a researcher in INDSR, Taiwan, believes that these actions have three purposes: 1) Blurring the mid-sea line and air defence identification zone to show that the Taiwan Strait is China’s internal sea and that activities of PLA aircraft and ships around Taiwan are normal. 2) Turn the waters around Taiwan into a combat training area for joint naval and air operations and conduct practical exercises on anti-access and area denial operations against the United States and Japan. 3) These exercises and large-scale naval and air training activities weaken Taiwan’s maritime and air vigilance.
All these activities have taken a toll on the PLA’s fuel budget, as the Chinese military fuel budget for 2022 hit a record high of 7 billion Yuan. The PLA still owes CNPC 4 billion Yuan to China Petroleum, and it is speculated that the fuel cost will exceed 10 billion Yuan by 2023.
Meanwhile, in a recent US Congressional Research Service submission on Taiwan’s defence and military issues, Catlin Campbell notes that although Taiwan enjoys some strategic advantages like extreme weather conditions making the Taiwan Strait perilous to navigate at certain times of the year, Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and densely populated coastal areas not suitable for amphibious landing. However, Taiwan’s challenges are increasing as it is facing asymmetric power balance coupled with increasing challenges at home (civil-military tense relations, vulnerability of energy, food, water, internet, and other critical infrastructure), and limited time and resources. She also highlights that the PLA’s recent engagement in persistent, low-level non-combat operations is eroding Taiwan’s advantages and readiness. She adds that the PRC's recent activities provide the PLA with training and intelligence-gathering opportunities. They also strain Taiwan’s armed forces, which face growing operational and maintenance costs associated with responding to frequent PLA activities. Beijing also seeks to use coercive but nonviolent military operations to sow doubt and fear in Taiwan’s elites and population about Taiwan’s military capabilities and create political pressure for Taipei to acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.
Section 4: PLA Military Modernisation
Joint Operations Command Centre: Eastern Theatre Command
Under the reformed PLA Structure, the Joint Operation Command Centre is one of the most important institutions directly under the CMC. It is the highest-level headquarters through which the President and his top military decision-making team exercise command and control over the military/combat operations. The JOCC sits at the top of the PLA’s chain of command. Below are the joint operational commands of China’s five military theatres and the units under each theatre. This framework was established in 2016 under Xi’s military reforms to “better centralise the supreme leadership and command of the military in the CMC.” Since it is the most important part of the PLA, specialised exams are conducted in the service to select officers into these command centres, both at central and theatre levels.
What is the requirement to qualify for this command centre?
The basic and physical fitness assessments include understanding basic theory, command information system operations, remote sensing image interpretations, basic physical fitness levels required in the PLA, and more. The professional assessment is different for every service and theatre. Application assessment includes the ability to react to complex emergencies. In the case of theatre-level JOC, specific theatre-centric requirements are based on location, threat perception, etc. Once an officer is selected, he will be trained with other candidates to understand joint operations and command centre functioning before being roped into active duty at the command centre.
PLA’s Anti-Suicide Drone Tech
Learning from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the PLA is deploying anti-suicide drone technology. Over the past eighteen months, Chinese articles have reported that Russia and Ukraine use suicide drones to attack the personnel in the tank and heavy artillery. Now, the troops from both sides have installed protective devices in their tanks to avoid such attacks. Taking a cue from this, the PLA has also started installing protective devices like grilled armoured, protective nets on the turret (upper body) of the Type 96 tanks, which were manufactured and majorly deployed on the India-China border. Compared with the Russian-Ukrainian design, the metal mesh deployed on the PLA tanks is small and thin.
PLA’s New Helmets (Augmented Reality)
The PLA is working towards new helmets, which are combined with augmented reality. In a documentary, “Dream Chasing,” some PLA officers wore special helmets. Xin Xin, researcher of the Chinese Military Academy, reveals that these are the new augmented reality helmets. Through these helmets, the latest information on the battlefield is displayed through the goggle display panel. This is real-time information, which includes minefield detection and real-time routes. The most important feature of this helmet is that it connects the soldier to the nearest logistic command centre to the person on the frontline. By doing this, the frontline and the logistic command centre personnel could work on the challenges in real time. The first mention of these helmets was in the PLA Daily on December 4, 2020. The PLA Daily mentioned that researchers are working on a smart helmet that would become the soldier's second brain. The article noted that the helmet, in the future, would provide mini radars and UAV-controlled systems. Of course, these helmets are still developing and far away from being a standard issue.
Graduate Students for Aircraft Carrier Programme
The Chinese Navy wants to hire graduate students to fly shipborne aircraft and is raising the age limit to expand its search as it seeks to improve the qualification of its air personnel. Besides upgrading its hardware from warships to warplanes, China is also trying to improve the caliber of its recruits, as the military is a career path in China that has traditionally favoured the relatively less educated. Training for these recruits will include three to four years of aviation theory and practical flight training. China is in the final stages of preparing its third aircraft carrier - the Fujian - for sea trials, a key step before the warship goes into operational service.
AI Strategies in PLA’s Coastal and Air Defence
The PRC has made significant strides in its ongoing contest with the United States to dominate the technological vanguard, especially in the military realm. One primary indicator of these efforts is the PLA’s vigorous pursuit of integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into its defence apparatus. Sunny Cheung draws insights from Chinese military documents and affiliated think-tank articles to reveal an emerging era where AI does not merely supplement but revolutionises military operations and strategic paradigms. This applies to China’s coastal and air defence in consolidating its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. He writes that the PLA emphasizes integrating AI into air and coastal defences to fortify its Western Pacific buffer to deter the US military and its allies from entering the potential battlefields like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
He writes that the PLA’s sophisticated algorithmic technology coordinates different satellites, enhances satellite communication efficiency, and handles space-based networks’ intricacies. This quality of communication is critical for surveillance, weapon system coordination, and multi-platform operations. There is already an observable shift underway in the operational mode for coastal defences; as robotics and drone technologies advance, the traditional “frontier reconnaissance followed by control” approach (前侦后控) is being replaced by one of “instantaneous detection and strike” (侦打一体).
Increased Activities at Nuclear Test Sites
In recent years, satellite images show Russia, the United States, and China have all built new facilities and dug new tunnels at their nuclear test sites. While there is no evidence to suggest that Russia, the US, or China is preparing for an imminent nuclear test, the images illustrate recent expansions at three nuclear test sites compared with just a few years ago.
One is operated by China in the far western region of Xinjiang, one by Russia in an Arctic Ocean archipelago, and another in the US in the Nevada desert. The satellite images from the past three to five years show new tunnels under mountains, new roads, storage facilities, and increased vehicle traffic coming in and out of the sites.
There is an increased activity at the Chinese nuclear test site in Lop Nur, a dried-up salt lake between two deserts in the sparsely populated western China. Satellite images show that a new fifth underground tunnel has been under excavation in recent years, and fresh roads have been built. A comparison of the images taken in 2022 and 2023 shows that the spoil pile has been steadily increasing. In addition, the main administration and support area has seen new construction projects. A new storage area was built in 2021 and 2022, which could be used for storing explosives.
Read More on the PLA Social Media Warfare and the Cognitive Domain
Section 5: Research
PLA Navy’s New Paper on Coast Guard
Please note that with my limited but improving Chinese skills, I have tried my best to translate this into English. There are possibilities of errors.
PLA Navy Dalian Academy’s scholars published a journal article in Military Operations, Research and Assessment Journal (dated - June 2023, Vol 38, No 3). This paper discusses ways and means to optimise the Coastguard’s use of warning shots in sovereignty assertion against foreign vessels.
Authors emphasise the importance of warning shots and claim the warning shots are of the following categories:
Discourage Shots
In a situation, where two ships are in close proximity, and Ship B continues on the same trajectory despite radar warnings by Ship A (Chinese coastguard), then Ship A should opt for a discourage shot. In this, Ship A uses high-pressure water equipment with noise racing equipment. This water equipment will cause strong psychological pressure on the offending boat and dissuade them from continuing on the same path.
For this, the water cannon, the author notes, should be in the front position of the ship, and there should be some distance between two ships (not specified). Notably, both ships should be sailing in the same direction and heading to the same point for this to work. Furthermore, the author mentions that the coastguard ship without a water cannon can also use a 12.7 mm machine gun.
Warning Shots
In this case, the course trajectory and the destination are the same, but the Chinese ships use the warning shot to stop the foreign vessel from reaching the destination. The author notes that it is important to avoid the target in order to avoid the escalation effectively.
Blocking Shots
In this section, the authors argue that when the coastguard’s warning shots are ineffective, and the Chinese coastguards are unable to deter the foreign vessel from entering the desired destination point (when the foreign vessel enters the baseline of the territorial water), then the coastguard can use the blockade techniques. Under this technique, the Chinese vessel first uses multiple warning shots and then uses its vessel to block the foreign vessel. This is very escalatory and often creates accidents. For instance, in 2020, a Chinese vessel rammed into a Vietnamese vessel in the South China Sea.
These observations are based on specific simulations conducted in the Dalian Naval Academy.
Some details missing:
When and where can the Chinese coastguards use these techniques?
Can these techniques work with larger navies like the American Navy in the region or only with smaller regional navies?
What would be the de-escalation protocol?
How are these protocols different from the existing protocols?
Discerning the Factors of China’s Nuclear Force Development
Dr. David Logan and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders’ latest research studies the growing discrepancies between China’s restrained declaratory policy and advancing nuclear capabilities. They developed six competing models for China’s nuclear strategy: 1) secure second strike, 2) nuclear shield, 3) Great Power status, 4) theatre deterrence, 5) bureaucratic politics, and 6) nuclear superiority. Each model implies different drivers, goals, and resulting force structures. For instance, in the secure second-strike model, China seeks to maintain a reasonably secure nuclear deterrent in the face of advancing adversary capabilities. The nuclear shield model is a more robust version of the secure second-strike model. China seeks to maintain a secure second-strike and use a more survivable and capable nuclear force to deter adversaries' limited use of theatre nuclear weapons and conventional military intervention. In the Great Power status model, China is no longer content with a “lean and effective” deterrent focused on maintaining a survivable second strike and is now pursuing a nuclear force more like the US and Russian nuclear forces for prestige and status reasons.
Based on a thorough review of the secondary literature, Chinese primary sources, and new open-source data, they test the predictions of each model against China’s current and projected nuclear force structure and the assessed values of the observable indicators. They find strong evidence for the secure second-strike, nuclear shield, and Great Power status models.
The First Battle of the Next War
Mark C. Cancian, Mathew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham at CSIS designed a wargame using historical data and operations research to model a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Some rules were designed using analogies with past military operations; for example, the Chinese amphibious lift was based on analysis of Normandy, Okinawa, and the Falklands. Other rules were based on theoretical weapons performance data, such as determining the number of ballistic missiles required to cover an airport.
The resulting wargame had over 2,500 counters that represented forces from the United States, China, Taiwan, and Japan. Air and naval operations were played on a five-by-six-foot map that covers the Western Pacific. Ground operations were played on a separate map that covers Taiwan. A 70-page “rules for umpires” laid out the game rules. Die rolls, combat results tables, and computer programs calculated combat results. Each turn was three-and-a-half days. Players came from a variety of senior governmental, think tank, and military backgrounds.
Results: The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll-on, roll-off ships while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads. However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly began. Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile, US submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, rapidly crippled the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and US surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan remains autonomous.
There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. The rest is futile if Taiwan surrenders before US forces can be brought to bear. This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the US's global position for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war.
Conditions for success: 1) Taiwan forces must hold the line 2) There is no Ukraine model for Taiwan 3) The US must be able to use its Japanese bases in Japan 4) The US must be able to strike the Chinese fleet rapidly and en masse from outside the Chinese defensive zone.
It is a very interesting read!
The Myth of Chinese Diversionary War
Prof. M Taylor Fravel’s article in Foreign Affairs argues that the Chinese leaders have rarely, if ever, started a conflict purely as a diversion, even during moments of domestic crisis. That is, in part, because the Chinese state has more control over public opinion and society, including protests than do other governments. When the Chinese economy falters, the danger is not diversionary war. It is that China’s leaders will feel weak and become more sensitive to external challenges, potentially lashing out to show strength and deter other countries from taking advantage of their insecurity.
To support this claim, Prof Fravel highlights various instances from the Chinese history including that of the Sino-Indian War, where he claims that China even offered a “package deal,” or swap of territorial claims, to India in April 1960 to resolve their territorial dispute despite the background of Tibetan revolt and the Great Leap Forward. Although China attacked India in 1962 over the disputed border, diversionary motives played no role in Beijing’s decision-making. China merely wanted to show India its resolve and deter future challenges on the border in a time of internal weakness.
He highlights that China’s behavior presents a conundrum. Its leaders have encountered strong domestic incentives to engage in diversionary crises or wars but almost never do so. Even if diversion as a tactic is rare—and perhaps unlikely in the future—domestic unrest in China can create incentives to use force for other reasons. Chinese analysts often refer to the idea of “internal troubles, external aggression” (neiyou waihuan). For instance, in the past, Chinese leaders have used force in such moments as a way to signal resolve to China’s adversaries, not to divert the public’s attention or increase social cohesion.
Read More
Technical history of PLA Nuclear Submarine by Chritopher Carlson and Dr Howard Wang
What Should India do before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis: Amb Vijay Gokhale
Section 6: Other Important News and Updates
China and the South China Sea
The recent problems between China and the Philippines started after Beijing warned Manila not to “stir up trouble” after the Philippine coastguard removed a floating barrier at a disputed reef that was deployed by China to block Filipinos from the traditional fishing ground. The Philippine authorities had said earlier that they would take “all appropriate actions” to remove barriers, which they say endanger Filipinos fishing in the Scarborough Shoal, which Manila also refers to as Bajo de Masinloc.
Elsewhere, China has also built two ground stations for its Beidou satellite system on the disputed South China Sea reefs. The stations, connected to China’s land-based ship automatic identification system (AIS), are installed at lighthouses located on North Reef and Bombay Reef in the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam and Taipei also claim. They use the BeiDou satellite network – completed in 2020 as a rival to the US global positioning system (GPS) – to locate the vessels and transmit signals.
China’s Lost Submarine
Last Month, there were rumours about a Chinese Naval submarine Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine suffering a serious accident near the Taiwan Strait. It was also reported that all the officers and soldiers on the ship were killed. There is no way of confirming this news, however, at the PLA’s monthly regular press conference, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, denied the rumours and said, “Relevant information is completely false. We hope internet users follow authoritative information released by China’s official accounts and do not be misled by ill-minded information.”
Pakistan and China
China and Pakistan conducted a joint air force training exercise last month within Chinese territory to further boost training and coordination between the two militaries and deepen their exchange and cooperation on military technology. Codenamed “Shaheen (Eagle) - X,” it is the 10th joint training exercise between the Chinese and Pakistani air forces. The exercise typically focuses on combat scenarios such as joint air defence and countermeasures. The two sides sent fighters, early warning aircraft, and several other types of aircraft, as well as ground forces such as ground-to-air missiles and radar and signal troops to participate in the exercise. Chinese naval aviation units will also be involved in the training. The “Shaheen (Eagle)” series between the two countries started in March 2011.
Elsewhere, Pakistan and China signed six key documents to help undertake the second phase of the USD 60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects under a new model, further cementing the all-weather strategic relations between the “iron brothers.”
Section 7: Military Vocabulary
42）參謀長 参谋长 canmou zhang Chief of Staff
43) 指揮 指挥 zhihui Command
44) 軍區 军区 junqu Military Region
45) 艦隊 舰队 jiandui Fleet
46) 軍區空軍 军区空军 junqu kongjun Air Force Military Area Command
47) 軍事 军事 junshi Military Affairs
48) 參謀 参谋 canmou Staff Officer
49) 軍官 军官 junguan Military Officer
50) 首長 首长 shouzhang Commander
Suyash Desai is a research scholar studying China’s defence and foreign policies. He is currently studying Mandarin at National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU), Taipei, Taiwan. He can be reached at @suyash_desai.
Website: www.suyashdesai.com
Great effort! Bravo!