India-China Border Problems, Taiwan, Military Modernisation, PLA Personnel Policies, China’s National Defence Mobilisation Offices, Military Vocabulary, Space, Arctic, Bandwagoning

Apr 07, 2023

Hello,

Wishing you all a very happy 288 Peace Memorial Day Holidays from Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

I am happy to share the latest edition of the PLA Bulletin: A monthly newsletter on news, analysis, updates and academic writing about the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

As always, please note that it’s a very long newsletter and might be folded into the email. So it’s best to open it in the browser by clicking on the logo.

As always, a sincere thank you for reading the newsletter. I hope you enjoy reading it and find it insightful.

Please take care and stay safe,

Suyash Ashok Desai.

(Kaohsiung, Taiwan)

Index

India-China Border Problems
Taiwan
Military Modernisation and PLA Personnel Policies, also National Defence Mobilisation Offices
Research Papers: What after Taiwan, India Balancing not Bandwagoning
South China Sea, PLA Space, Arctic, Deterrence
Military Vocabulary

Section 1: India-China Border Problems

China’s Ministry of Civil Aviation has recently released the third set of standardised names for 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls “Zangnan, the Southern Part of Tibet.” The official names of the 11 places were released on Sunday by the ministry, which also gave precise coordinates, including two land areas, two residential areas, five mountain peaks and two rivers and listed the category of places’ names and their subordinate administrative districts. This name list is published in Chinese Hanzi, Tibetan script and Pinyin. The first batch of the standardised terms of six places in Arunachal was released in 2017, and the second batch of 15 places was issued in 2021.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs responded, “This is not the first time China has made such an attempt. We reject this outright. Arunachal Pradesh is, has been, and will be integral and inalienable part of India. Attempts to assign invented names will not alter this reality.”

The Rand Corporation 2022 research report titled “Competition in the Gray Zone” has noted that for over 50 years, China has conducted significant grey zone tactics against India in the military, economic, and geopolitical (now also cyber and IO campaigns), and it classifies Chinese renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh as a geopolitical grey zone tactic. Like much of the existing literature, this paper classifies China’s geopolitical grey zone tactics as an instrument of national power the PRC leverages for coercion, and it involves China’s use of diplomatic or political measures. Read the full report here, besides India, this report also studies Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan.

Meanwhile, last month, India and China held the 26th meeting of the Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on the India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) to discuss the proposals on how to resolve the remaining two friction areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Over the course of the stand-off since May 2020, generally, the WMCC meets first, followed by the Corps-Commander at Maldo or Chushul border point, paving the way to further disengagement. This was the first in-person meeting since July 2019. Until now, the disengagement has been achieved (leading to the creation of buffer zones) at the Galwan Valley, north and south of the Pangong Lake, PP17A in Gogra and PP15 Hot Springs. However, the stand-off continues at the two points – Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nullah (Demchok). Both the issues pre-date the Pangong Tso transgressions, with PLA blocking the Indian Army’s rights to patrol its points 10 to 13 in Depsang Bulge and in the CNN track junction area, south of Demchok. It is understood that the Indian side stuck to the restoration of patrolling rights in the Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nullah area at the latest 17th round of border meetings, while the Chinese side stuck to its position by claiming that the situation was normal.

Recent Developments in Tibet that Impact India

China recently made public its “medium to long term railway plan” for Tibet, which announced expanding the TAR rail network to 4000 km by 2025 from the current 1400 km. This includes the Xinjiang-Tibet network, which follows the route of the G219 highway passing through the disputed Aksai-Chin region. Although the plan was made available recently and construction was started long back, you can find details of it in my Occasional Paper on Tibet published with the Takshashila Institution. Here is the link.

However, another important aspect, which is intrinsically linked with the peace and security on the India-China border is the announcement of the construction of the Bomi-Ranwu (波密-然乌) sections of the Yunnan-Tibet railway. This railway line will pass through Shangri-La, Dechen, and meet the Sichuan-Tibet railway at Bomi. The line will be extended up to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province. On completion, it will connect Kunming, Chuxiong, Dali, Lijiang, Shangri-La, Deqin, Markam, Bomi, Nyingchi, Tsetang, Gonggar and Lhasa. Nyingchi is the closest point on the route to the Indian border, and this line is further integrated with the upcoming wider Tibetan railway network, which runs parallel to the Indian border across Tibet and reaches Hotan in Xinjiang, passing through the disputed Aksai-Chin region.

The completion of this rail line will reduce the distance from Dali, Kunming, Kaiyuan, and Lancang to Tibet. These cities in Yunnan host the PLA 75th GA’s major installations. Dali has a PLA mechanised infantry brigade, Kaiyuan hosts an infantry brigade, Lancang has an infantry brigade, and Kunming has infantry, artillery, air defence and armoured brigades (China Brief, July 22, 2016). These units were previously part of the 14th Corps, which was later reorganised as the 14 Group Army (GA) before being incorporated into the 75th GA under the STC. The 75th GA is currently garrisoned in the Yunnan province. The construction of the Tibet-Yunnan railway network will be completed by 2030. Upon its completion, travel time between the two regions will be reduced by half, allowing for quicker mobilisation of forces. Compared to mobilising forces from the CTC, which acts as a reserve force for every TC, including the WTC, mobilisation of the 75th GA to Tibet would be relatively faster. Also, given the relatively high altitude at which troops in the 75th GA are stationed in the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau region, their acclimatisation to Tibet’s climatic conditions would be relatively easy in comparison to the Beijing-based CTC.

For more details, check this Jamestown China Brief Article.

Elsewhere, in a recent notice dated January 30/31, the PLA released an enquiry purchase order of a "combined mace" that belongs to the category of cold weapons. According to the public information on the military procurement network, the PLA issued two announcements on procurement enquiries on the military procurement network. One is a mace, and the other is a combined mace.

Mace and combined mace are weapons used for fist fighting, certainly to be used on the India-China Border. The purchase order is for February 4-5, 2023.

Also another important point is that these maces are to be made of insulating materials. There are two requirements for this purchase order.

1) This mace has to be longer than the standard/ordinary mace. This means the length has to be longer. There is no explanation given to this, but the Chinese social media voices discuss that this is due to hitting the opponent from a distance and still being able to protect oneself from the opponent’s weapon.

2) It has to be a combined mace. The tender is for the combined mace that can be carried separately, meaning spikes can be separated from the rod if required. The Chinese social media claims that the bid was made public to enable an extensive design plan to equip the soldiers with as perfect mace as possible.

The purchase order details that the PLA has placed an order of 2600 such maces. The length of the mace is around 180 cm. It consists of three parts: the hammerhead, the rod body, and the rod drill. Among them, the hammer head is about 50 cm, equipped with fine steel spikes, spikes and sharp corners at both ends, machined, welded and quenched to ensure strength and the rod body is made of zinc steel pipe. The order was placed in the first week of March 2023.

It looks like with the onset of summer, we are in for more challenging times on the India-China border.

PLA SSF New Base on the India Border near Arunachal Pradesh

There is a new electronic warfare base near Nyingchi, 30 km from Arunachal Pradesh. The base is reportedly operated by the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLA SSF). Some dates indicate that this was formed in December 2021. However, no data is available at all, either in Chinese or English, apart from the image below.

Also, it looks like the base is still under construction.

Visible objects from the compound:

1) Military trucks.

2) Three circular objects in the upper right corner look like radars (VORs: VHF Omnidirectional Radio range), which makes it a likely PLA SSF site.

3) The right-hand side blue shelters look like aprons, where smaller helicopters could be parked.

4) There are two approach roads to enter this base, one from the left, which goes around the base and comes from the north, and the other, which is on the right, which leads to the south, most likely towards the border.

Elsewhere, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry’s INDSR’s latest publication of the military technology in the Xinjiang Military regions details that this military command still retains four mobile field combat divisions. (Background: The PLA started converting its division-regiment structures to brigade battalion structures in 2011, and it was sped up in 2015 after Xi Jinping implemented its military reforms. Compared with brigades, divisions are larger in size and have almost twice the strength of brigades. The composite division has more artillery than the brigade and can independently carry out long-range deep strikes.) Now, the PLA only retains six divisions – 2 in Beijing and 4 in Xinjiang.

The Xinjiang Military Region has jurisdiction over four combined divisions, eight support brigades, plus 15 frontier defence regiments, as well as the Southern Xinjiang Military Region, the Military Department of the Production and Construction Corps, and 16 prefecture commands. Furthermore, this command, along with the Tibet Military Region (District), hosts Type 15 tanks (fastest and lightest Chinese tanks) and also 99 A heavy-duty tanks with the 99A guidance system that acts as the brain of the battlefield. Besides these two tank types, this region also hosts the Type 96 B, Type 88, and Type 59 D old tanks, which are still in service and probably only in service with this military command.

The PLA’s Growing Airpower Projection Capabilities in the Western Theatre Command

PLA Logistics and Sustainment: PLA Conference 2022 has a chapter on the PLA’s growing capabilities in the WTC. In this chapter, Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, and Matthew Funaiole highlight that there are more than 50 airports and helipads in Tibet and Xinjiang, of which 36 have been constructed or upgraded since 2017. The authors highlight that the new facilities are closer to the Indian border, and the placement of new heliports highlights that the PRC might be pursuing a new strategy of locating heliports in remote areas without supporting ground infrastructure. The authors also highlight that earlier, Tibet only had five airports. There was an immense gap, for instance, 950 km between Ngari Gunsa Airport in western Tibet and Shigatse Airport in central Tibet. Now, with the construction of Ngari Burang and Shigatse Tingri airports, the gap has been reduced to 500 km. The authors also highlight that earlier, the distance between Chinese airports and Indian strategic facilities was more than 500 km. Now it has changed, for instance, the Bareilly Air Force Station is 400 km from Ngari Gunsa and 200 km from Ngari Burang (under construction). There are many more details in this article, here is the link to it.

Also, China freezes Ananth Krishnan and Anshuman Mishra’s visas (Indian journalists from the Hindu and Prasar Bharti).

Section 2: Taiwan and China

This week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen arrived in the US on a sensitive stop-over, vowing en route not to let external pressure prevent the island from engaging with the world after China threatened retaliation if she met US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. This marks her 7th transit through the United States during her time as Taiwan’s leader and is the 29th US transit by a sitting president of Taiwan since the first in 1994. Tsai’s 2023 transit is distinguished by an in-person meeting between President Tsai and US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, which marks the highest-level meeting during such a transit. During her transit, she stopped in New York City from March 29–31 on her way to Guatemala and Belize. The following week, she also stopped in Los Angeles from April 4-6 as she returned to Taiwan. This was the most defining and critically watched aspect of her trip as she, in person, met with Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy and other congressional leaders, such as Representative Mike Gallagher, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum.

Before her meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated China’s furious objections to meetings between Tsai Ing-wen and US officials. “China firmly opposes any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan,” Mao told reporters at a daily briefing. “China will continue to closely follow the situation and resolutely safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity.” China has particularly warned that a meeting between Tsai and US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, a Republican from California, would bring a strong but unspecified response.

PLA’s response:

Ahead of a planned meeting, the PLA Eastern Theatre Command vowed to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, with multiple land, naval, and air exercises focusing on amphibious landing missions underway.
A Chinese aircraft carrier group was off the island's southeast coast.
The Chinese navy sent three warships for live-fire drills in the East China Sea, including the frigate Xiangtan, guided-missile destroyer Taiyuan, and destroyer Taizhou to conduct combat drills.
China's Fujian maritime safety administration launched a three-day special joint patrol and inspection operation in the central and northern parts of the Taiwan Strait that included moves to board ships, it said on its WeChat account.

Elsewhere, defence analyst Ben Lewis published the data on China's ADIZ violation for March 2023. He records 122 aircraft were tracked inside Taiwan's ADIZ in March 2023, 58 more than in March 2022. The highest monthly total on record is August 2022, with 446. He also records that March 1 saw the highest single-day violation with 21 aircraft. He highlights that the median line was crossed 41 times, Northeast ADIZ violation happened four times, Eastern ADIZ violation occurred six times, and Southwest ADIZ violation happened 71 times.

Check this very important graph by him on the median line violation by the PLA:

This is the link to his fantastic tracker!

I would also recommend reading his recent analysis for CSIS on 2022 ADIZ violations. In this report, he has classified violations into three categories, routine violations involving one to five aircraft, assertive violations involving six to nine aircraft, and reactionary violations involving ten or more aircraft. Most reactionary violations are tied to geopolitical developments involving Taiwan, the United States, and other regional powers that Beijing believes are contrary to its “One China Principle.” In 2021, reactionary violation days made up 8.8 per cent of all days when violations took place. In 2022, reactionary violations made up 20.5 per cent, a major increase. He also argues that throughout 2022, PLA violations of the ADIZ began involving increasingly diverse combinations of aircraft conducting more complex operations. There is much more in the paper, I highly recommend reading it!

Meanwhile, CIA chief William Burns warned about Xi Jinping's ambitions towards Taiwan last week. Burns said that the United States knew "as a matter of intelligence" that Xi had ordered his military to be ready to conduct an invasion of self-governed Taiwan by 2027. "Now, that does not mean that he's decided to conduct an invasion in 2027, or any other year, but it's a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition. Our assessment at CIA is that I wouldn't underestimate President Xi's ambitions with regard to Taiwan," he said, adding that the Chinese leader was likely "surprised and unsettled" and trying to draw lessons from the "very poor performance" of the Russian military and its weapons systems in Ukraine.

Research Reports on Taiwan:

Check this INDSR report by Dr Yang Yikui on the implications for the Indo-Pacific region if Taiwan falls. He argues that Taiwan’s security is inseparable from the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan is also intrinsically linked with the stability of the liberal international order. Furthermore, military implications include an extension of China’s A2/AD (more on this in the research paper section). It could also result in triggering unrest among regional actors. Finally, if Taiwan falls, it will embolden China to advance towards the second strategic military direction, possibly India or a territorial dispute with Japan.

Also, read this report by Wang Shushen on the Adjustment of US arms sale policy towards Taiwan published in Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs 亚太安全与海洋研究 (full English version available on CSIS Interpret). The author, an expert in US-Taiwan relations at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that shifts in the level and nature of US arms sales to Taiwan that began under the Trump administration. These changes have forced Beijing to deploy its own set of deterrence measures. The Obama administration adopted a package-deal approach to arms sales to Taiwan, selling a total of $14.07 billion in military equipment in three batches. But the Trump administration moved away from the previous package-deal approach and normalised the process, reviewing a purchase request as soon as it was made and announcing the results individually. The Trump administration presided over the largest number of arms sales to Taiwan over any other administration since the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, having announced 11 sales amounting to over $18 billion. These changes in the dynamics of arms transfer, Wang argues, will make it difficult to prevent and control a crisis in and around the Taiwan Strait in the future.

Finally, check this report by Lonnie D. Henley for CMSI on Overcoming a Protracted Blockade for Taiwan. The author argues that an extended Chinese blockade will likely determine the outcome incase of a war over Taiwan. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious US investment in systems and operational concepts that the US currently do not have. Unless it makes that investment, the US might win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing, but it cannot win the war.

Furthermore, also check this very interesting paragraph from the same paper. The author writes Chinese articles about the August 2022 exercises using a new term for the joint blockade, lianhe fengkong (联合封控). The only time they used the traditional term for blockade—fengsuo (封锁) — was when quoting Western observers. Officially translated as “blockade and control,” fengkong had previously appeared in PLA writings about border defence operations but not in connection with sea blockade. The author’s tentative conclusion is that fengkong combines the concepts of maritime blockade with establishing air, sea, and information control, but this awaits further evidence.

Section 3: Military Modernisation and Personnel Policies

Let’s start with China’s defence budget. In March 2023, China announced a yearly defence budget of RMB 1.55 trillion ($224.8 billion), marking a nominal 7.2 per cent increase from the 2022 budget of RMB 1.45 trillion ($229.6 billion). This continues a recent trend that has seen nominal yearly percentage increases in the upper single digits.

However, how much China actually spends on its military is widely debated. There are three popular estimates, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates the overall 2021 figure to be $293.4 billion, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) puts the number at $285 billion.

In 2021, the US DoD noted that China’s real military spending may now be around 1.1 to 2 times higher than stated in its official budget. More details in the CSIS study. Do check the expenditure breakdown and type of defence spending.

In the same week as China’s defence budget was announced, Gen Liu Zhenli took over as the new chief of a Chinese military command body (head of PLA’s Joint Staff Department) similar to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Meanwhile, China has implemented a newly revised policy for the management of PLA civilian employees, which in all likelihood, seeks to rectify retention issues and improve the attractiveness of a career as a PLA civilian. The new regulations are the third iteration of guidance pertaining to the PLA’s civilian workforce that was first released in 2005 and revised in 2017. Chinese reports claim that the newly revised regulations seek to “make civilian personnel management more professional, refined, and scientific” and to “facilitate the high-quality development of the civilian personnel workforce.”

The CNA report highlights that these revised PLA regulations are likely part of an effort to address issues with recruiting and retaining its 20,000 or so civilian personnel. For example, writing in 2017, a faculty member of the People’s Armed Police Engineering University attributed high rates of civilian personnel terminating their employment with military academies to reasons including: (1) the disparity in their salaries compared to active duty counterparts and (2) the lack of opportunities for career advancement. Getting the policies for civilian personnel right will be important for the PLA going forward as (1) it seeks to orient more of its active-duty personnel toward combat and combat support functions, and (2) the PLA’s inventory of high-tech platforms demands more complex maintenance regimens.

Furthermore, the PLA has released new guidance for enlisted personnel to apply for admission to degree-conferring military academic institutions. It started the 2023 round of recruiting junior enlisted personnel for attendance at the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) schools within the PLA and PAPs. Junior enlisted must meet several basic requirements to begin the process of applying to earn either a four-year undergraduate degree at an official school or a three-year technical degree at an NCO school. Details.

Special Subsection: China’s National Defence Mobilisation Offices

Since the end of last year and the first quarter of this year, China has set up multiple national defence mobilisation offices (國防動員辦公室, guófáng dòngyuán bàngōngshì). From December 2022 until now, these offices have been formed at Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Fujian, Wuhan, Hunan, Sichuan, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hubei and some other provinces. Some local press releases and reports highlight that these are formed on the basis of the Civil Air Defence Office and are managed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).

The stated main function: Economic mobilisation, civil air defence, traffic readiness, equipment mobilisation, technology mobilisation, planning, organisation and implementation, etc. However, the revealed function looks like the initial stage of mobilisation during a contingency on the Chinese border, be it India, Taiwan or South China Sea. It looks like the recruitment and management of militia and reserve personnel at the local level is also a mandate with these offices (Speculative!!).

Why was it formed, what is the mandate and how does this system work?

It looks like the lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War inspire this. Russia's failure in mobilising troops could be the primary reason for China's latest initiative related to the mobilisation office. This initiative was proposed during the 20th Party Congress, and since then, various provinces and cities have set up these units. One of the first units was set up in Fujian on December 15, 2022. Then units were set up in Beijing on December 28, 2022, and in Shanghai on February 20, 2023.

A PLA Daily article dated January 31 demanded a new pattern of national defence mobilisation. Another report on February 24 claimed that defence mobilisation from the provincial military system to the local people's government is fundamental. China's mobilisation is completely commanded by the National Defense Mobilisation Commission, which before this reform, was jointly led by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. The Central Military Commission has a National Defense Mobilization Department (National Defense Mobilization Commission, Development Division – one of the 15 small commissions). It is completely centralised, however, with the formation of mobilisation offices, China is partially attempting to decentralise mobilisation power to the local level. The centre will still have complete command over the mobilisation decision, but the local governments would be responsible for the mobilisation of militias and reserve forces. Additionally, along with the mobilisation, these offices will also recruit and manage the militia and reserve forces at the local level. Simply put, the military regions (former military commands) had mobilisation responsibilities earlier, now it is with local governments. The theatre commands, however, will still have a major say during wartime.

The local government offices will recruit and manage the militia and reserve forces, and they may have to pay for the recruitment first. The CMC’s National Defense Mobilisation Department in the theatre office could provide training for them.

How would this impact China’s border regions?

There are different impacts during war and peacetime. Local governments could recruit militia and reserve personnel from their jurisdiction during peacetime. For instance, local Tibetan offices could recruit more Tibetans and Han Chinese from the TAR and train them for mobilisation. Similarly, Fujian province office personnel would recruit personnel from coastal regions and train them for the Taiwan contingency scenarios. Since local offices are handling the recruitment, their training would also be at the local levels in the specific theatre command with region-specific and contingency-specific requirements. How this would impact the border disputes is still unclear; however, more grey area personnel are being created due to this, which could have an impact on the territorial disputes.

During wartime, this personnel could probably 1) Act as a stopgap until the backup forces arrive 2) This personnel could also be useful in certain logistical help for the PLA. It could range from transportation to temporary construction, etc. The role is still undefined. In case of an emergency, this personnel could also compensate for the shortage of military personnel caused by China’s demographic changes (since they would occasionally be training with theatre commands).

Hypothetical Scenario Building:

For instance, take the India-China scenario. Tibet's local offices would recruit and train people with Tibet and South Xinjiang military districts and Western theatre command. In peacetime, they could be used to help border defence units with logistics supplies. But during wartime, they will support the PLA and compensate for the shortage of military personnel. It is still unclear, as the reform has happened recently, however, the picture will get clearer as more experienced and better-equipped PLA scholars and observers will write about what this means for the PLA and China's territorial disputes.

Please note that I am also trying to understand the meaning and impact of this reform. If you feel that there are some errors in understanding, please feel free to write back to me, and I would be more than happy to learn from you and publish it in the next issue so that we get more clarity on this!!

Elsewhere, The People's Liberation Army Navy has started selecting graduates from junior high schools in 14 provincial-level regions for its teen aviator program. The selection process began in late March in 14 provinces and municipalities, including the provinces of Henan, Shandong, Hubei, Jiangxi and Chongqing municipality, involving nearly 4,500 qualified applicants, according to the Navy's flight student recruitment office.

Finally, a report suggests China's ammunition production rate is five to six times that of the United States. The US military's inventory is only enough for a week's worth of war in the Taiwan Strait. China's production capacity of explosives and propellants has surpassed that of the United States, and the firepower gap between the Chinese and American militaries is widening. This majorly includes the CL-20 explosives (new cage-like polynitroamine compound explosives), which China mastered in mass production.

China's Background: In the 1980s, CL-20 was developed by the China Lake facility, primarily to be used in propellants. It has a better oxidizer-to-fuel ratio than conventional HMX or RDX. It releases 20% more energy than traditional HMX-based propellants and is widely superior to conventional high-energy propellants and explosives. PS: The US uses HMX or RDX for producing explosives, and CL-20 is 40 times more potent than both HMX and RDX. The CL-20 is used in most Chinese explosives used across all services, including the PLA Ground Forces.

Section 4: Research Paper

Military Implications of Chinese Control Taiwan

Dr Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Prof Caitlin Talmadge’s paper on assessing the implications of Chinese control of Taiwan in International Security reflects on Taiwan’s potential military value and its implications for US grand strategy. They highlight the changes that were to occur if China were to deploy assets on the island for undersea warfare and ocean surveillance. The article, in particular, focuses on submarines and hydrophone arrays along with the associated coastal and air defence assets necessary to assist with their missions. According to them, such deployments would impede the future US ability to operate naval and air forces in the Philippine Sea. They also argue that, over the longer term, if China develops a large fleet of truly quiet nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), basing them on Taiwan would enable China to threaten the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and to strengthen its sea-based nuclear deterrent in ways that it is unlikely to be otherwise able to do. There has been abundant literature discussing the political importance of Taiwan, emphasizing that the US commitment is vital to maintaining the credibility of other US alliances and to democracy more broadly. There also has been literature on diplomatic implications and impact on regional balance. But this is one of a kind article discussing military balance after reunification, which is a relatively understudied area.

India’s Radical Re-Imagination, No More Bandwagoning

Dr Yogesh Joshi’s recent article in the Washington Quarterly highlights how balancing, not bandwagoning, has historically been India’s preferred foreign policy strategy with different great powers. He argues concurrent with the rise of China, India has begun to abandon its non-aligned bandwagoning and embrace the logic of balancing. In the present bipolarity between the US and China, India has no option but to align closely with the US. In explaining New Delhi’s turn to balancing, he highlights four reasons:

China’s rise as a potential Asian hegemon has fundamentally altered India’s balancing objectives and threatened India’s interests and values.
China’s rise has also shifted India’s status calculus.
China’s military and economic assertiveness and the ensuing Sino-US great power rivalry have also altered India’s calculation of the costs of greater alignment with the US.
Closer alignment with the US comes with costs for India, however, the last decade of constant Chinese aggressiveness has forced New Delhi to reevaluate the costs of alignment compared to the costs of isolation.

India’s constant self-restraint vis-à-vis developing a more robust strategic partnership with the US has hardly paid any dividends in its relationship with China. The author concludes that from a position of weakness, any accommodation with China will serve neither India’s interests nor its ego. India’s relative weakness can only be alleviated by a rise in India’s internal balancing capability and/or through additional constraints on Chinese power. The Indo-US relationship serves both of these ends. American military and economic assistance may help India internally and reduce the power asymmetry with China.

India-China Rivalry: The Contest that is shaping the Asian Century

Dr Amrita Jash’s recent article for the International Spector on the India-China rivalry argues that the 21st century is expected to be the dawn of the “Asian Century”, with Asia becoming the centre of gravity of great power politics. What contributes to the shaping of this century is the rise of two Asian powers, India and China, which share common aspirations but act differently. She discusses the context of the “Asian century” based on the geopolitical dynamics between India and China, as differing perceptions combined with a clash of interests have led to geopolitical conflict and competition between the two countries. From this perspective, she argues that the “Asian Century” is being shaped by the ‘confrontational coexistence’ between India and China, which implies a departure from the long-held axiom of ‘peaceful coexistence’.

Section 5: Near Seas, Nuclear, PLA Space, Arctic

Chinese coastguard ships lingered in Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea for a record 80 hours and 36 minutes before the three vessels left the area Sunday evening. It is the longest period Chinese ships have intruded into the waters since the Japanese government put the islets under state control in 2012. Initially, a total of four Chinese vessels entered Japanese waters near the Senkakus in succession. One of them moved to the contiguous zone outside territorial waters on Saturday night, but the remaining three continued to sail in Japanese waters. Of the four that entered Japanese waters, one was equipped with what appeared to be an auto-cannon.
China is, for the first time, keeping at least one nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine constantly at sea, according to a Pentagon report. The new patrols imply improvements in many areas, including logistics, command and control, and weapons. They also show how China started operating its ballistic missile submarines in much the same way the United States, Russia, Britain and France have for decades.
After a Chinese buyer expressed interest in taking over the facility, the US military has been prodding Ottawa to buy a privately owned hangar adjacent to a NORAD airbase in the Arctic community of Inuvik. For nearly a year, Ottawa resisted American pressure over the property, located near a strategic piece of the continent’s air defence infrastructure that would make a prime target for foreign surveillance. The Canadian government had previously leased the hangar to shelter military aircraft but argued it no longer had a need for it. Now, the government appears to have had a change of heart. The hangar sits beside the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s forward operating airbase in the Western Arctic. It is located several kilometres from two satellite download sites, one belonging to National Resources Canada and the other owned by Norway’s Kongsberg Satellite Services. The NORAD forward operating location, which is at Inuvik Airport, has hangar space for up to six fighter aircraft and was activated for service in 1994.
China plans to build a huge satellite network in the earth’s near-orbit to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink over concerns that Elon Musk’s internet-beaming satellites pose a major national security threat to Beijing following their successful use in the Ukraine war. Recent Chinese research note that plans are underway to deploy a national mega-constellation of almost 13,000 low-orbit satellites, while military scientists are pursuing research on how to “suppress” or even damage Starlink satellites in wartime scenarios. An opaque state-backed project — referred to in China’s satellite industry as “GW” or “Guowang,” which translates as “State Network” — first gained momentum in 2021 as a rival to the US.
The Philippines announced the locations of four additional military bases to be used by US troops, with one site near the hotly disputed South China Sea and another not far from Taiwan. Previously, in the 2014 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the Philippines gave US forces access to five bases. It is expanded to nine. The sites are a naval base and airport in Cagayan province and an army camp in the neighbouring province of Isabela. The naval base in Cagayan province’s Santa Ana is about 400km from Taiwan. Another site will be on Balabac Island, off the southern tip of Palawan Island, near the South China Sea.

Also, read Dr Howard Wang’s Twitter thread on the difference between the Chinese and US concepts of deterrence.

Section 6: Military Vocabulary

Traditional - Simplified - Pinyin - Meaning

34) 班長 - 班长 - banzhang - Squad Leader

35) 排長 - 排长 - pai zhang - Platoon Commander

36) 連長 - 连长 - lian zhang - Company commander

37）營長 - 营长 - ying zhang - Battalion Commander

38) 團長 - 团长 - tuan zhang - Regiment Commander

39) 旅長 - 旅长 - lǚ zhang - Brigade Commander

40) 師長 - 师长 - shi zhang -Divison Commander

41) 軍長 - 军长 - jun zhang - Corps Commander

Suyash Desai is a research scholar studying China’s defence and foreign policies. He is currently studying Mandarin at National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He can be reached at @suyash_desai.

Website: www.suyashdesai.com

The PLA Bulletin

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