Outline for Non-Military Operations, India-China Border Problems, Modernisation, Taiwan, Space, Military Exercises, Coercion, Military Vocabulary, Japan's Defence White Paper

Issue No 4

Jul 24, 2022

您好 from Taiwan. I hope all of you are doing well and are fit and fine!

I am happy to share the latest edition of the PLA Bulletin: A monthly newsletter on news, analysis, updates and academic writing about the Chinese People’s Liberation.

Scope:

I. Outline for Non-Military Operations for the Armed Forces (For Trial Implementation) | 军队非战争军事行动纲要（试行）|

II. India-China Border Problems

III. PLA Modernisation

IV. China, Taiwan and the South China Sea

V. Research Papers

VI. China and the Space

VII. News and Update

VIII. Military Vocabulary

Before we start, please note that it’s a very long newsletter and might be folded in the email. So it’s best to open it on the browser by clicking on the logo. Happy reading!

I. Outline for Non-Military Operations for the Armed Forces (For Trial Implementation) |军队非战争军事行动纲要（试行）| jūnduì fēi zhànzhēng jūnshìxíngdòng gāngyào (shì xíng)|

In November 2020, PLA watchers and analysts discovered that the Central Military Commission (CMC) issued a new operational doctrine (trail) for joint operations for the Chinese armed forces. It was only the fifth time that the PLA had changed its operational doctrine since 1949. (Dr Joel Wuthnow and Prof M Taylor Fravel’s recent article for the Journal of Strategic Studies explain these changes in great detail. For details about the changes in the past, you could read Prof Fravel’s book, Active Defense, also this Fairbank centre discussion will be helpful). Similar to the change in November 2020, the CMC has now signed what appears to be a new “Outline for Non-Military Operations for the Armed Forces” (Trial basis). For the PLA, non-military operations include operations other than fighting but are not restricted to disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy etc. For now, we know that the outline contains six chapters and 59 articles, covering the basic principles, organisation and command, types of operations, support and political work. The Xinhua report claims that the outline “systematically regulates basic principles, organization and command, types of operations, operational support, and political work, and implements them for the troops to give non-war military operations a legal basis.”

Mr James Char argues that the theorisation and practice of MOOTW in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is not new, with the term (非战争军事行动 in Chinese) having appeared in Chinese military literature since 2006. While these latest MOOTW outlines might determine how the PLA’s activities are operationalised in missions designated to safeguard China’s claims to sovereignty and territorial integrity along its disputed land borders and in the maritime domain, the order is more likely merely an attempt by the PLA leadership to consolidate its MOOTW guidelines to standardise their implementation on the ground.

He also highlights that the PLA theoreticians and practitioners in 2006, including those from the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), National Defense University (NDU), and the Army Command College began to formulate their own ideas about MOOTW. In doing so, they were influenced by their American counterparts – even though the United States military had discontinued the use of the term after having expounded on the concept 11 years prior in JP 3-07 “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

He argues that similar yet different viewpoints regarding what MOOTW entails within the Chinese military may be the real reason behind the announcement of this outline. With the AMS, NDU, and other PLA units holding similar yet different understandings of MOOTW – ranging from a 6-type category among active-duty personnel to a 12-type classification system according to the NDU – both the organisational principles and implementation of China’s MOOTW are in need of consolidation.

When asked about the recent guidelines in the PLA’s monthly press conference, Senior Colonel Tan Kefei, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense (MND), said, “The outlines came into effect on June 15, 2022. Guided by the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, the outlines implement Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military, and uphold a holistic approach to national security. They aim to effectively prevent and defuse risks and challenges, cope with emergencies, protect people’s life and property, safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, maintain regional and world peace and stability, innovate the way the armed forces are employed, and standardise the organisation and execution of MOOTW. The outlines are of great importance for the armed forces to effectively fulfill their missions and tasks in the new era.”

Qi Leyi, a Taiwan military commentator, highlighted an interesting aspect of these guidelines. He emphasised that the Chinese Communist Party started to study “non-war military operations” many years ago. Russia defines the Ukraine operation as a “special military operation” rather than an invasion, saying it aimed to fight the Nazis. The CCP’s implementation of this outline is to rationalise the definition of future military operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, as they can be regarded as a foreshadowing of legal battles. He argues, “In the future when China invades Taiwan by force, Xi Jinping will not say it is a war, because war is a matter between the two countries, and he will use this special military operation” or “non-war military operation.” He highlighted that the “Outline” mentioned, “innovating the use of military power.” This is a very important sentence for the future. China would further deepen this concept so that it could be used the future military operations against Taiwan, in the South China Sea, and possibly also on the Sino-Indian border areas.

It has been just a month since the guidelines were rolled out, and we will likely learn more about them in the upcoming months and years.

II. India-China Border Problems

This month, India and China held their 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks to revive the stalled process of disengagement and de-escalation in eastern Ladakh. Talks were held on the Indian side at the Chushul border personnel meeting point and went on for more than 12 hours. While an agreement for disengagement from Patrolling Point-15 was close in the last few rounds of talks, China refuses to discuss other friction areas, Demchok and Depsang, maintaining that they are not a part of the current stand-off. This has stalled any further progress. India has been insisting on comprehensive disengagement and de-escalation to end the ongoing stand-off in eastern Ladakh. Since the stand-off began in May 2020, the two sides have so far held 15 rounds of Corps Commander-level talks with disengagement undertaken from both sides at Pangong Tso in February 2021 and from PP 17 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area in August 2021, in addition to Galwan in 2020 after the violent clash. The 15th round of Corps Commander-level talks took place on March 11, 2022. There have been talks at the political and diplomatic levels as well. After the 15th round, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India, while he and the Indian Foreign Minister Dr S. Jaishankar also met on the sidelines of the G-20 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bali, where they discussed the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Check this very interesting article by Lt Gen HS Panag. He argues that the India-China military talks have run their course. The choice before the two nations is to either live with the status quo or raise the level of engagement leading to a summit for an interim border agreement. A possible solution, that he argues, is for India to accept the 1959 Claim Line with equidistant buffer zones in areas of disagreement except in the Indus Valley and for China to agree to demarcate the entire border as an interim agreement. Interestingly, this was the offer made by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in his letter to Prime Minister Nehru dated 7 November 1959.

Meanwhile, as attempts were made to achieve disengagement through border talks, some activities were noted near the border on the Chinese side. For instance, The Hindu reports that there have been some major military and infrastructure updates undertaken by the PLA in the last two years since the stand-off began, which include commissioning long-range artillery and rocket systems, upgrading air defence systems, expanding runways, and hardening blast pens to house fighter aircraft. Based on the intelligence inputs, the report highlights that “In the western sector across the LAC, the accommodation capacity was for 20,000 troops in 2020 before the stand-off began. That has now been expanded to 1.2 lakh billets — infrastructure and accommodation-wise.” Furthermore, the PLA has inducted the Type 15 tanks, upgraded from the ZBL-08 to the latest ZTL-11 armoured personnel carriers, upgraded airbases across Tibet, developed additional heliports at Shigatse and Rudok, deployed the PHL-3 Multi-Rocket Launch Systems (MRLS) with a range of over 100 km and replaced the older air defence systems with HQ-17 surface to air missiles and the long-range HQ-9 systems. More details in this paper. Of course, India has also made changes, including the deployment of Smerch MLRS and BrahMos cruise missile systems in Arunachal Pradesh closer to the LAC.

Meanwhile, according to a newly released highway construction plan, Ananth Krishnan reports that China is planning to build another highway through Aksai Chin, running along the Indian border and connecting Xinjiang with Tibet. The G695 national expressway will be only the second national highway through the disputed Aksai Chin region, where China controls 38,000 sq km of land claimed by India, since the controversial construction of the G219 highway in the 1950s, and is expected to be completed by 2035. It will run even closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) than G219 and is likely to broadly run along the course of G219 from Mazha in Xinjiang in the north, through Aksai Chin, which is currently administered under the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, heading south along the borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan, and down to Lhunze in southeastern Tibet right across the border from Arunachal Pradesh.

Tibet’s Existing Road Network

Source: Suyash Desai, “Civilian and Military Developments in Tibet,” Takshashila Discussio Document, December 06, 2021, The Takshashila Institution. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/61e5f12005a42f2bec475733/1642459437927/Civilian-and-Military-Developments-in-Tibet-1.0-SD.pdf (Also, check the table in the appendix).

China also stepped up its military activities near the border as Chinese aircraft flew close to contested areas even as the border talks didn’t progress. After Chinese aircraft flew close to contested areas along the LAC, India scrambled aircraft in response and raised the matter with the Chinese side, according to reports. Reminds very much of what has been happening in the Taiwan Strait for the last two years.

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping met the Xinjiang Military District's top brass in Urumqi - regional capital. The ongoing dispute falls under the South Xinjiang Military Command, which reports to the Xinjiang Military District - which is under the PLA Western Theatre Command.

China also recently conducted a combined-armed live-fire drill near the Indian border in Xinjiang and also tested the precision strike capability of its new rocket launch system, PCL-191, at high altitude.

On the Indian side, the Indian Army has issued a notification to induct Mandarin experts into the Territorial Army. This follows a recent effort by the Army to increase the number of Mandarin speakers as well as offer courses in Tibetology for officers posted along the LAC to orient them in Tibetan culture, traditions and practices. An Indian start-up has also developed a 600gm Artificial Intelligence-based device, which would help the Indian patrolling soldiers on the LAC to understand mandarin and reply back instantly. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh unveiled it at the ‘AI in Defence’ symposium.

Finally, don’t miss this NDTV news, which highlights that the second village in the Amo Chu river valley - after Pangda - which is extremely close to the Doklam border conflict point, is now virtually complete while China has stepped up the construction of a third village or habitation further South. A bridge across the Amo Chu has been constructed at the site of this third village, with excavation activity clearly visible.

More Readings:

-Nod for Close to 80 FDI Proposal from China

-7 Missing Workers found in the Forest near China Border

-Dalai Lama says Military an Outdated Option

-India’s Cold-Blooded Realism will help Balance China

-China, India build Roads, Bridges in the Disputed Himalayan Region

III. PLA Modernisation

Aircraft Carrier

Finally, China launched its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, in June 2022. The Type 003 carrier’s launch marked a milestone in the country’s push for a blue-water navy capable of operating far from Chinese shores. Fujian is China’s third carrier, the largest it has ever built, and the most sophisticated. Its three cutting-edge electromagnetic catapults promise to put a greater range of warplanes into action more frequently, along with more fuel and munitions. It could be argued that Fujian would require anywhere between 18 to 24 months to conduct sea trials and be combat-ready. It is roughly 318 metres long and weighs around 80,000 tonnes, meaning the Fujian outstrips Britain’s new carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and is surpassed only by America’s supercarriers.

Source: The Economist

Fujian’s catapult represents a technological leap—and a gamble. The only operational carrier with an electromagnetic version is America’s newest one, the USS Gerald R. Ford, which has yet to be deployed, partly due to problems with the catapult. Fujian could eventually house J-15s and J-35s, and even KJ-600s. Meanwhile, some reports have already surfaced about China’s fourth aircraft carrier. The South China Morning Post’s Minnie Chan reports that China’s next and fourth aircraft carrier is likely to be a conventional diesel-powered vessel similar to the newly launched Fujian. This means the PLA warships would still lag behind their 11 active US Navy counterparts, all of which are nuclear-powered. The conventional choice is likely because China’s naval nuclear reactor technology is not advanced enough to support an aircraft carrier.

H-20 Bomber

Reports indicate that China is planning to conduct a flight test for an essential type of aircraft that has crucial strategic and historical significance (H-20 bomber), said a top official at the flight test centre of the Chinese military's top warplane contractor. The remark was made by Ge Heping, Party chief of the Chinese Flight Test Establishment under the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). Ge urged all personnel involved in the development of the aircraft to realise the extreme importance of completing this mission fully. The PLA Air Force gave a hint on the flying wing design of its next-generation, long-range strategic stealth bomber, H-20 aircraft, by including it in a scene in the service's recruitment video in January 2021. A promotional video for AVIC released in May 2018 also showed the front outline of a similar aircraft covered with a blanket, suggesting the flying wing design was similar to the US B-2 bomber.

The only operational stealth bomber today is America’s Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, which first flew in 1989 and entered operational service in 1997. Unlike any other operational stealth platform in the world today, the B-2’s flying wing design is effective at limiting detection from both high and low-frequency radar bands. As a result, the somewhat dated and significantly larger B-2 Spirit is often more difficult to detect and track than even America’s most modern stealth fighter, the F-35. In 2018, China seemingly confirmed that its forthcoming H-20 stealth bomber would leverage a flying wing design reminiscent of America’s own B-2 Spirit. That same assessment also indicates that China has had success in trying to reach the goals outlined in the 2014 China Daily column, stating that this new bomber would likely employ 5th generation (stealth) technologies, boast a range of “at least 8,500 km” (5,281 miles), a payload capacity of “at least 10 metric tons,” and nuclear-weapon-delivery capabilities.

Other Capabilities

Chinese scientists developed a highly sensitive and portable gravity detector for military use, including underwater navigation. The device’s portability and ease of use make it an ideal candidate for military applications such as the mobile launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine navigation, according to the research team from Zhejiang University of Technology in the eastern city of Hangzhou. The gravimeter could allow a submarine to detect the presence of an underwater mountain or another submarine without using sonar, helping to avoid accidents like the one that befell the nuclear submarine USS Connecticut, which crashed into a seamount in the South China Sea last year.
The PLA Navy has quietly commissioned a new type of diesel-powered submarine with an unusual sail design that may improve stealth. A source close to the People’s Liberation Army confirmed that the new submarine had recently joined the Eastern Theatre Command fleet. China has not formally revealed the name or details of the new submarine, though some analysts have referred to it as the Type 039D.
Beijing also conducted a test of a ground-based system designed to intercept a ballistic missile. This was the sixth test of the land-based anti-ballistic missile system.
Y-20 warplanes boost aid delivery to quake-hit Afghanistan.

IV. China, Taiwan and the South China Sea

Taiwan

Liu Jieyi, the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and a possible candidate to replace Wang Yi as China’s next Foreign Minister, published an article in the People’s Daily. The article claims that solving the Taiwan issue and realising the complete reunification of the motherland is the unswerving historical task of the Communist Party of China, the common will of all Chinese sons and daughters, and an inevitable requirement for realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. An important aspect of this would be preventing and resolving major risks and hidden dangers in the Taiwan Strait, creating a “favourable environment” for national rejuvenation. “Our growing comprehensive strength and significant institutional advantages continue to be transformed into efficiency in work related to Taiwan issues and push forward the process of national reunification,” wrote Liu. Reunification should be promoted as part of the country’s rejuvenation, and this would serve as the “main goal” of Beijing’s new plan on Taiwan, while solving the Taiwan issue based on the mainland’s development would serve as the “strategic idea”, wrote Liu. It is the first time that Liu has laid out the framework of a strategy for dealing with Taipei.

Meanwhile, the US approved a possible arms sale of US$108 million of vehicles, small arms, combat weapon systems and logistical support items to Taiwan. The sale would also enhance Taiwan’s military interoperability with the United States and other allies, and the island’s armed forces would have no difficulty absorbing the equipment and support. Taiwan has previously talked of problems accessing some US weapons it has on order, like shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and has complained of stepped-up military pressure from Beijing to force it into accepting its sovereignty claims.

Elsewhere, Beijing has steadily increased the number of combat aircraft flying into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and further south in the Bashi Channel. According to Taiwan’s defence ministry, the PLA conducted 555 sorties in the first six months of the year, of which 398 involved combat aircraft, compared with 187 in the same period last year. The fighter jets, accompanied by other support planes, would allow the PLA to form an effective strike group to take on the enemy and reinforce its naval operations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Taiwan plans to stage island-wide drills simulating missile and warplanes attacks by the Chinese PLA. The drills coincide with the annual Han Kuang military exercises. However, as Taiwan plans to conduct a national-wide drill, a Chinese naval reconnaissance vessel was spotted in waters off Hualien County earlier last week. It was spotted 44 nautical miles off the coast of Hualien’s Fengbin Township at around 4 am. The PLA’s reconnaissance and intelligence vessels have been previously spotted in the area when Taiwan’s military was preparing to carry out large-scale drills.

Nancy Pelosi and Taiwan

China has issued stark private warnings to the Biden administration about the upcoming trip to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, triggering alarm bells among White House officials who oppose her visit. The Financial Times reports that the Chinese warnings are significantly stronger than the threats that Beijing had made in the past when it was unhappy with US actions or policy on Taiwan. Officials are concerned that China could seek to declare a no-fly zone over Taiwan ahead of a possible visit by Pelosi as an effort to upend the trip, potentially raising tensions even further in the region. It could also respond by flying fighter jets further into Taiwan’s self-declared air defence zone, which could trigger a response from Taiwan and the US. Politico reports that inside the Pentagon, officials believe the trip could increase tensions in the region as Beijing ratchets up the rhetoric and flexes its muscles in the South China Sea. Pelosi is planning to use a military aircraft to fly to the island, which is standard for congressional delegations. But to the Chinese, “it looks like a military operation,” said one US official to Politico. Some reports indicate that China could plan a potentially destabilising response. At least one Chinese state-media commentator has suggested that the Chinese air force might send planes to intercept Pelosi, which could spark a showdown. Other actions could be bigger warplanes incursions, crossing the median line, missile tests near Taiwan and flying over Taiwan. As the Biden administration raises concerns about the trip, Republicans are backing up Pelosi, noting that she has a long track record of pushing back against China. It is going to be an interesting month.

South China Sea

The US Navy is stepping up its activities in the South China Sea. The USS Benfold transited the Taiwan Strait on Tuesday after sailing near the disputed Spratly Islands on July 16 and the Paracel Islands on July 13 during what the United States calls freedom of navigation operations. The USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group began operating in the South China Sea for the first time this year on July 13, with the US Navy’s 7th Fleet saying it was conducting maritime security operations as part of routine operations in the Indo-Pacific region. Anti-submarine reconnaissance by US military aircraft has also intensified recently, with 28 US military aircraft operating in the South China Sea, including 15 large reconnaissance aircraft and at least 13 P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft.

V. Research Papers

Explaining Chinese Military Coercion in Sino-Indian Border Disputes: Ketian Zhang

Dr Ketian Zhang published an article in the Journal of Contemporary China. She argues that the geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion against India has been low since the 1990s, China has consistently used militarised coercive tools. In contrast, the high geopolitical backlash cost pertaining to South China Sea disputes led China to utilise nonmilitary coercion post-2007. She also provides descriptive data regarding China’s coercion in Sino-Indian and the South China Sea disputes. In these two sets of disputes, cases of China’s coercion have increased since 2006 and 2007, respectively, making them comparable cases.

In the case of India, she argues, China utilises military coercion aiming at changing Indian behaviour. It is important to note that low geopolitical cost does not preclude the use of non-military coercive tools. Instead, the argument means that low geopolitical cost leaves more room for China to use military coercion. As such, the geopolitical backlash cost for China to use military coercion—throughout the post- 2006 period—has been low in Sino-Indian border disputes. China, therefore, chose military coercion. However, China’s use of military coercion toward India does not mean the geopolitical backlash cost will remain indefinitely low. Theoretically, if India and the United States become formal allies in the future, the geopolitical backlash cost could become high. However, as of now, the empirical evidence has not indicated a change.

However, in the South China Sea, China prefers gray zone to military coercion. It is important to note that there is no difference between maritime and land disputes from the theoretical perspective. It is in the empirical cases that the geopolitical costs differ. The geopolitical backlash cost concerning the South China Sea has become high since the early 2000s. A recently declassified document from the DOD in 2002 indicated that it was in 2002 that the DOD started to take actions to ‘begin [the] shift of focus towards Asia,’ in particular, noting the ‘redirection of attention within DOD towards Asia’ and increase in ‘the focus on China, Asia-related scenarios in Service and Joint wargaming.’ China believed that military means were too costly to use in the South China Sea disputes and peace remained the priority. Such assessment stands in contrast to China’s assessment regarding Sino-India border disputes. In Sino-Indian border disputes, such concerns about high geopolitical backlash costs are absent, even in the most recent government think tank reports. Put simply, China believes that the United States has greater stakes and interests in Southeast Asia than India and has been consistently emphasizing the possibilities of ‘tangible involvement of great external powers,’ implying the concerns about US military involvement in the South China Sea.

The Rising Power’s Audiences and Cost Trade-offs: Explaining China’s Escalation and Deescalation in Maritime Disputes: Shuxian Luo

Dr Shuxian Luo’s article for Asian Security highlights China’s way of handling interstate crises arising from its maritime territorial claims, which varies from case to case, vacillating between escalation that prioritises “safeguarding sovereign rights” (weiquan) and de-escalation that puts an emphasis on “maintaining stability” on its periphery (weiwen). She develops a framework, the audience cost trade-off hypothesis, to explain when and why China is likely to escalate or deescalate maritime disputes. She argues that when deciding whether to escalate, Chinese decision-makers usually weigh and make a trade-off between their anticipated domestic political costs should they back down and their potential international costs should they take an escalatory stance. For this, she studies two major interstate crises in the South China Sea: the 2012 China-Philippine standoff in the Scarborough Shoal and the 2014 Sino- Vietnamese clash over the deployment of the oil drilling platform HYSY-981. She demonstrates that within China, there is greater leadership consensus and parochial interest divergence toward Vietnam than toward the Philippines, leading to Beijing’s decisions to deescalate the HYSY-981 clash but escalate the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Border trade and development initiatives in China’s hinterland gave southwestern provinces, especially Guangxi, a major stake in advocating for stable relations with Vietnam. Guangxi’s development interests seem to have effectively balanced Hainan’s hardline impulses in China’s handling of its maritime conflict with Vietnam.

Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing: Kevin McCauley

Kevin McCauley’s research report for China Maritime Studies Initiative highlights that the PLA believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. He highlights that despite the recognised importance of logistics support, the PLA likely does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and its allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas could only be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.

Read More:

-Threat Inflation and the Chinese Military: Dr Michael D. Swaine

-China’s Southern Strategy: Nadège Rolland

VI. China and the Space

Today, China launched another big rocket to space at 2:22 pm Beijing time, and once again, no one knows where or when it will come down. It will be a replay of two earlier launches of the same rocket, the Long March 5B, which is one of the largest rockets currently in use. For about a week after launch, the world’s watchers of space debris will be tracking the 10-story, 23-ton rocket booster as wisps of air friction slowly pull it back down. The chance that it will strike anyone on Earth is low but significantly higher than what many space experts consider acceptable. The powerful rocket was designed specifically to launch pieces of China’s Tiangong space station. The latest mission lifted Wentian, a laboratory module that will expand the station’s scientific research capabilities. It will also add three more spaces for astronauts to sleep and another airlock for them to conduct spacewalks. After the first Long March 5B launch in 2020, the booster re-entered West Africa, with debris causing damage but no injuries to villages in the nation of Ivory Coast. The booster from the second launch, in 2021, splashed harmlessly in the Indian Ocean near the Maldives. Still, Bill Nelson, the NASA administrator, issued a statement criticising the Chinese. “It is clear that China is failing to meet responsible standards regarding their space debris,” he said.
Earlier this month, China sent a new data relay satellite into orbit from Xichang Satellite Launch Station. The Tianlian II-03 was launched by a Long March 3B carrier rocket. Developed by the China Academy of Space Technology, Tianlian II-03 is China's second-generation geosynchronous orbit data relay satellite. It will provide data relay and TT&C (telemetry, tracking and command) services for manned spacecraft and low and middle orbit resources satellites. It will also support the TT&C for the spacecraft launch. After entering its preset orbit, the newly launched satellite will create a global network with in-orbit Tianlian II-01 and Tianlian II-02.
According to a new study by Chinese scientists, the South China Morning Post reports that an orbital carrier controlled by artificial intelligence could be used to patrol and counter attacks in space. The study highlights that a large orbital platform carrying hundreds of CubeSats – tiny satellites that weigh about 1kg (2.2lbs) – could defend China’s space assets with speed and efficiency. But they say it would need help from AI to determine exactly when and where to release the CubeSats so they could fend off enemy satellites. According to the researchers, the complexity of a large and fast space battle would be beyond the human brain – and even beyond some powerful AI algorithms. Studying the best strategy for AI to control an orbital carrier would have “strong economic and military value”, the team said in a paper published in Chinese Space Science and Technology, a peer-reviewed journal run by the China Academy of Space Technology.

VII. News and Update

China-Pakistan Military Exercises

China and Pakistan kicked off the Sea Guardian 2, joint maritime military exercises at a military port in Wusong, Shanghai. Themed as "joint response to maritime security threats", the Sea Guardians 2 exercises aim to promote bilateral defence cooperation and enhance the capabilities of the two militaries to respond to maritime security threats jointly, and consolidate the traditional friendship between the two counties, the presser read. The exercises were held in the waters and airspace off Shanghai from July 10 to 13 and consisted of two phases, i.e., port planning and maritime exercise. During the first phase, the two sides carried out onshore activities such as operation planning, professional expertise exchanges, cultural and sports competitions. During the second phase, the two navies held maritime exercises, including attacking maritime targets, tactical manoeuvres, anti-submarine operations, replenishment at sea, reinforcing damaged ships, and anti-aircraft and anti-missile operations.

Japan’s Defence White Paper

Japan published its defence white paper equivalent (defence of Japan 2022). It has a few interesting things about China’s coercion and deterrence. It claims that China is relentlessly continuing attempts to change the status quo by coercion near the Senkaku Islands, leading to a matter of grave concern. For instance, in October 2021, Chinese and Russian warships conducted joint sails that circled around Japan. This exercise seemed to have been intended as a show of force against Japan. Chinese military trends, combined with insufficient transparency about China’s defence policies and military affairs, have become a matter of grave concern to the region, including Japan and the international community, and these trends have been intensifying in recent years. Additionally, strengthening Russia-China cooperation resulting in joint bomber flights and joint warship sailing in Japan’s vicinity is a matter of concern. Finally, the white paper claims that China’s technological advances in the non-military sectors are helping China improve its capabilities in space and cyberspace, along with their capabilities in the electromagnetic domain and logistics delivery, under the recognition that these capabilities are methods of warfare that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential.

The white paper highlights three methods that Japan uses to protect its interests. Improving self-capabilities (conventional, non-conventional), relying on US-Japan Alliance and promoting multi-layered, multi-faceted defence partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries.

China’s Non-Commissioned Officers

China is recruiting non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for specific purposes among 2022 national college entrance examinations (or gaokao) sitters for the first time since the nation launched the NCO programme. The 2022 gaokao sitters can apply for a three-year program at relevant universities and colleges, and those qualified would be recruited as NCOs. Universities and colleges will be responsible for the first two and a half years of academic instruction. In the final half year, the military will take over their instruction as cadets. The schools will handle the final graduation procedures. Afterwards, program participants will get military ranks as NCOs, effective from September 1 of their graduation year.

VIII. Military Vocabulary

7) 威懾 Wēishè (Deterrence) 威慑

8）軍種 Jūnzhǒng (services, branches) 军种

9）兵種 Bīngzhǒng (Arms) 兵种

10）炮兵 Pàobīng Artillery

11）排 Pái Platoon

IX. Read More

Deep Comprehension of the Global Security Initiative: Coordinating Our Own Security and Common Security: CSIS-Interpret
The Epochal Value of the Global Security Initiative Surpasses the Traditional Western Security Outlook: CSIS- Interpret
Xi’s New Global Security Initiative: M Taylor Fravel, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Manoj Kewalramani and Jude Blanchette.
China’s Research Battle: US Opposition to Join New Projects over Fears of Beijing’s Military Ascent
PLA Marine Corps: The PLA Daily
Island Hopping Campaign

Suyash Desai is a research scholar studying China’s defence and foreign policies. He is currently studying the traditional Chinese language at National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

The PLA Bulletin

Discussion about this post