The People's Liberation Army in 2024!

From high-profile military exercises and strategic initiatives to sweeping policy shifts and a series of corruption charges and purges...

Dec 26, 2024

Hello,

I’m back! 😊 I hope you’re all doing well. It’s been a really long time—almost 14 months since the last issue. My sincere apologies for the extended silence. Over the past year, I’ve been completely consumed by my admission process, visa issues and juggling three part-time jobs to fund my Chinese language education, university applications and examinations’ fees and living expenses in Taipei. It was an incredibly demanding and challenging phase.

But I’m happy to share that: I’m nearly at a C2 level (the final level), with a vocabulary of 10,000 words, I’ve managed to enroll and pursue a MicroMasters in Data Science and Statistics starting in January 2025, and have applied to 12 top US universities for my PhD - focusing on international relations and security studies of course. (Unfortunately, two of these universities are not accepting IR/security studies students this year, so ten applications).

Given the increasing number of excellent newsletters on the PLA, I’ll be transitioning this newsletter to an occasional publication. My focus for 2025 will be on Chinese (getting C2 before I leave Taiwan), exploring data science tools and methodologies, revisiting the research projects that have been on hold, and hopefully flying to the US for September 4! 😊

I’m excited about what 2025 has in store, and I am especially looking forward to hearing back from these universities in the first quarter of the year. I sincerely hope you all had a fantastic 2024.

Wishing you all a Merry Christmas and a very Happy New Year!

新年的時候，注意安全，玩得開心吧！

Warm regards,

Suyash Desai.

PS: As always, please note that it’s a very long newsletter and might be folded into the email. So, it’s best to open it in the browser by clicking on the logo.

Index

Timeline of Events in 2024
Special Briefings:
- The People’s Liberation Army Training with AI
- PLA’s Defensive Swarm Tactics
- Expansion of China’s New Type of Militia Force [新型民兵力量体系]
- Hong Kong is the New Tianjin: MCF and Space Warfare
- Joint Sword A, Joint Sword B, and Recent Military Exercises around Taiwan
Articles and Papers from 2024
Books for 2025
Thanks for reading The PLA Bulletin! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
Timeline of Events in 2024

2024 was nothing short of transformative for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). From high-profile military exercises and strategic initiatives to sweeping policy shifts and a series of corruption charges and purges, the PLA left an indelible mark on the security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

In this issue, we delve into the critical events that shaped the PLA’s operational tempo, propelled technological advancements, and exposed underlying challenges within its ranks. Let’s unpack the key moments of 2024 and explore what they reveal about the PLA’s trajectory to be a world-class force—a term yet to be defined by the leadership.

January

- 2024 started with Admiral Dong Jun becoming the 14th Minister of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He succeeded General Li Shangfu, who disappeared from public view and was removed from office on October 24, 2023. Li was the shortest serving and the first from the former PLA Strategic Support Force (PLA SSF). On the contrary, Admiral Dong served in the Southern Theatre Command, commanded the PLA Navy as a deputy Commander, was named Commander of the PLA Navy in September 2021, and now has been appointed as the Defence Minister. Notably, Admiral Dong is still not a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Simultaneously with the appointment of Admiral Dong as the Defence Minister, nine top PLA generals were dismissed from the Chinese National People’s Congress. This included five PLA Rocket Force Commanders (PLA RF), who were purged in 2023.

- Meanwhile, the PRC reportedly built a military base with newly drilled boreholes — ideal for bottling up firestorms of deadly radiation from large nuclear blasts. I would encourage everyone to watch Prof Fiona Cunningham's video on nuclear modernisation for the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies. I especially liked her division of recent changes into four categories – size of the arsenal, diversity, accuracy, and readiness.

- Elsewhere, there has been an attempt in 2023 and 2024 to replace Tibet with Xizang 西藏 slowly. Every MFA statement since mid-2023 (especially September/October) has stated Xizang, and not Tibet.

- Meanwhile, Taiwan re-elected the Democratic People's Party (DPP) Candidate for the post of Presidency, and Lai Ching-Te was elected as the President. However, no party won a majority in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan for the first time since 2004, as the elections saw DPP win 51 seats, the Kuomintang (KMT) 52, and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) eight. The DPP, which had held a majority in the 113-seat body since 2016, suffered a net loss of 11 seats on Saturday. Being based in Taipei, I was privileged enough to visit the DPP headquarters on the eve of the election results. This is what I witnessed. Initially, Beijing had a calibrated approach to respond to President Lai's victory, which was followed by Qiushi Journal republishing a previous speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping from July 2022, including Xi's vow to "develop and strengthen Taiwan's patriotic reunification forces," China's Ministry of State Security issuing a rare statement on WeChat that pledged to intensify counterintelligence and "anti-separatist" efforts related to Taiwan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserting, "To uphold the one-China principle, and other assertive voices in Beijing's annual Taiwan Work Conference on February 22 and 23. The PLA held Joint Sword a Military Exercises around Taiwan on May 23, 2024, three days after President Lai took office.

- Elsewhere, it was reported that over 700 Chinese border outposts were connected to the national power grid. This means that by January 2024, Chinese military capabilities on the borders had improved tremendously. This includes the living conditions of troops and the deployment of advanced, power-consuming weapons and equipment. The Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission worked together with the National Energy Administration and carried out power grid constructions for border defence troops in batches. Something that is extremely relevant from an Indian security standpoint.

- January ended with the sacking of Senior Rocket Researcher Wang Xiaojun. Wang led the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology from June 2019 through at least mid-2023. The institute touts itself as the nation's oldest and largest base for the development, testing and production of missile weapons and launch vehicles.

February

- February was largely quiet for the PLA due to the delayed Chinese New Year in 2024.

- However, it was reported in February that Chinese scientists developed a game-changing military surveillance device for electronic warfare. Scientists claim that this device achieved seamless, wide bandwidth, real-time monitoring and analysis of the electromagnetic spectrum. Furthermore, it covers a massive frequency range, which picks everything from amateur radio broadcasts to Starlink satellites. If true, this technology would be groundbreaking in detecting the enemy signals at an unprecedented speed, decoding the physical parameters of the signals, and effectively suppressing them, thus creating fog for the enemy.

- Meanwhile, ChinaPower published this insightful report highlighting the expanse of the Chinese infrastructure to project power on the western borders. The report claims that within its western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, China is constructing and upgrading dozens of airports and heliports—a large majority of which are military or dual-use facilities. China is supplementing its airpower expansion with new roads, rail, and other infrastructure that are upgrading the PLA’s logistics capabilities and enabling more rapid movement of troops, weaponry, and equipment. The pace of development in the region accelerated following standoffs and skirmishes between China and India along disputed portions of their border in 2017 and 2020.

March

- The Philippines, on March 5, accused China Coast Guard vessels caused two collisions with Philippine vessels and a water cannon on a boat, leaving four crew injured during a resupply mission in the South China Sea. The incidents happened in waters around Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where the countries have contested maritime claims. The armed forces of the Philippines said the rotation and reprovisioning of troops on the BRP Sierra Madre was “a routine task to sustain military forces deployed in the West Philippine Sea and maintain Philippine presence in its exclusive economic zone.” The footage of one of the incidents, shared by the Philippines, showed its crew rushing to place a buffer between the two coastguard vessels as they collided. Furthermore, on March 23, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel hit a Philippine supply boat with water cannons near Second Thomas Shoal, injuring crew members and damaging the vessel, Philippine officials say. China says the Philippines intruded into its territorial waters despite repeated warnings. Earlier, on January 12, a Filipino fishing boat captain claimed that a Chinese Coast Guard vessel drove him away from Scarborough Shoal and forced him to dump his catch into the sea.

Some incidents from 2023: December 9, 2023: The Chinese coast guard surrounded a supply ship and blasted it with a water cannon in the area around Second Thomas Shoal. The head of the Philippine military, who was aboard the supply boat, said they were also “bumped” by a Chinese ship. November 10, 2023: China blasted a Philippine supply ship with a water cannon near the Second Thomas Shoal; China claimed it acted appropriately under maritime law to defend its territory. October 22, 2023: A Chinese Coast Guard ship and accompanying vessel ram into a Philippine Coast Guard ship and a military-run supply boat near the Second Thomas Shoal. Chinese coast guard claimed the Philippine vessels “trespassed” into what it said were Chinese waters. September 26, 2023: A Philippine coast guard claimed it removed a floating barrier from blocking the entrance to the lagoon at the Scarborough Shoal, put in place by China to prevent Filipino fishing boats from entering. China would later replace the barrier.

- In March, India freed 10,000 soldiers previously assigned to its western border to guard a 532 km stretch of its frontier with China. This was for the Indian states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.

- At the National Party Congress, representatives Wu Xingfeng from the Joint Operations Command Center of the Central Military Commission and Military General Gong Maodong, Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command, spoke in turn and put forward opinions and suggestions on strengthening joint combat capability building and enhancing national defence science and technology innovation. Note that General Gong Maodong was previously the Commander of the Southern Theatre Command Army, also responsible for the India Contingency, before being assigned to the Western Theatre Command.

April

- The Philippines and China nearly sparked a standoff at Sabina Shoal in the Spratly Islands in April 2024 when the Philippines deployed Teresa Magbanua, a coast guard ship, to observe Chinese forces suspected of preparing to occupy the area. It ended in September when the Philippines withdrew Teresa Magbanua after Chinese vessels blockaded and rammed the ship. A replacement ship has since been sent. The Philippines wants to control Sabina Shoal, an unoccupied atoll inside its exclusive economic zone. Sabina Shoal, which lies just 86 miles west of the Philippine province of Palawan and over 600 miles from China, is near an area rich in oil deposits, and on routes Manila considers crucial for trade and security. It anchored the Teresa Magbanua, one of its largest coast guard ships, at the Sabina Shoal in April to try to stop China from what the Philippines sees as efforts to try to build an island there. The Philippine Coast Guard have also pointed to piles of crushed and dead corals apparently dumped on the shoal as signs of Chinese land reclamation underway. China has denied the accusation. However, the building and fortification of artificial islands are key parts of how China has asserted its claims over contested waters hundreds of miles from its coast. China accused the Philippines of trying to permanently occupy Sabina Shoal by parking the Coast Guard vessel on it, just as it had grounded the warship at Second Thomas Shoal. Beijing even sent tugboats to Sabina Shoal, which some read as a threat to tow the Philippine ship away. China has not resorted to guns, but it is using blockades, blasting water cannons and sailing dangerously close.

- Meanwhile, India rejected China's renaming of about 30 places in its northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. This was a continuation from 2023, when China's Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a statement in which it said it had "standardised" the names opens new tab of 11 places, including five mountains, in what China calls its southern Tibet region.

- I also came across this article by Robust Rust and this very interesting speech by Xi Jinping for China's Second Artillery (PLA Rocket Force) in December 2012. It contained new language describing the alert level of Chinese missiles.

Traditional: 要加快建立可操作的值班制度平戰結合，高度戒備，隨時作戰，提升日常戰備整體水平

Simplified: 要加快建立可操作的值班制度平战结合，高度戒备，随时作战，提升日常战备整体水平

“We must accelerate the establishment of an operational duty system combining peacetime and wartime, on a high level of alert, able to fight at any time, raising the overall level of daily combat readiness.”

- April also witnessed the creation of a new force, the PLA Information Support Force, and the disbanding of the PLA SSF. Since then, the PLA has been operating with four services and four arms. More details.

A trade secret: keep a close eye on Hong Kong-based publications. The PLA SSF dissolution was announced on April 23. On January 21, 2024, I read a Chinese language-based article claiming that the PLA SSF would be dissolved, and the article then dwells into the reasons for it. I was extremely dismissive of it and thought it was some propaganda. I should have raised an alarm!

May

- China is building the world’s first drone carrier. The world knows about China’s first three carriers; the largest and most capable, the Type-003 Fujian, is currently undergoing sea trials. The fourth new carrier is very different. Its claim to fame will not be that it is larger. Instead, we are confident that this ship is the world’s first dedicated fixed-wing drone carrier.

- China is also upgrading its border villages on the India-China border. After constructing more than 600 xiaokang (小康) villages, it is upgrading these villages with newer dual-use facilities, including barracks, military domes, communication towers, and more.

- Problems in the South China Sea continued as China sent dozens of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels toward a disputed atoll, a large show of force aimed at blocking a civilian protest flotilla from the Philippines. The Filipino group organizing the flotilla of about 100 small fishing boats, led by five slightly bigger ones, said it wanted to assert the Philippines’ claims to Scarborough Shoal. There were reports of vessels being rammed, punctured with knives, damaged by water cannons and targeted by military-grade lasers. From February 2023 until May 2024, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behaviour on at least 12 occasions.

June

- Chinese National Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun, delivered a scathing attack on Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-te, warning that Taiwan’s “aggressive” behaviour and foreign moves to abet it were eroding prospects for peaceful unification. Dong Jun said Lai and his new government were “now using military means to reject unification and making a lot of noise about arming themselves”. “Facing the strong military of the big motherland, such armed conspiracies will be futile [and] will only lead to their own destruction more rapidly,” Dong told the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Asia’s largest security conference. Full speech.

- Meanwhile, the US and its allies accused the PLA of recruiting Western military talent to train their aviators. To overcome the shortcomings, they claim that the PLA has been aggressively recruiting Western military talent to train their aviators, using private firms around the globe that conceal their PLA ties and offer exorbitant salaries. The concerns about Western pilots training their PLA peers have intensified since revelations in 2022 that the Test Flying Academy of South Africa, a private school, had used more than two dozen retired British Air Force, Navy and Army pilots to help train Chinese military pilots. - Authorities in Xinjiang have been systematically changing hundreds of village names with religious, historical, or cultural meanings for Uyghurs into names reflecting recent Chinese Communist Party ideology. Words like "dutar," a traditional Uyghur string instrument, or "Mazar," a shrine, have been removed from the names of villages and replaced with words such as "happiness," "unity", and "harmony" — generic terms often found in the Communist Party's policy documents.

- In June 2024, China's leadership accused two former defence ministers of taking "huge" bribes and of other acts of corruption that compromised military promotions and the nation's weapons production complex. Two announcements from the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo, a council of 24 top officials, laid out multiple accusations of crime and insubordination against Gen. Li Shangfu, the defence minister for much of 2024, and Gen. Wei Fenghe, the minister from 2018 to 2023. The statements suggested that more heads could roll in expanding investigations. The speculation has been building since 2023 when Xi Jinping began inquiries into military corruption and misconduct after senior officers from the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force were abruptly replaced or disappeared.

July

- Images captured from space show the growth of Cuba’s electronic eavesdropping stations that are believed to be linked to China, including new construction at a previously unreported site about 70 miles from the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The CSIS report highlights China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence network to the US door steps. The US southeastern seaboard brims with military bases, combatant command HQ, space launch centre, and military testing site.

- Note paragraph number 55 from the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernisation, passed on July 21, 2024.

“We will refine the functions of the CMC command center for joint operations, enhance its command functions in major security fields, and establish mechanisms for facilitating its coordination with central Party and state departments. We will optimize the composition of the command centers for joint theater operations and improve the configuration of commands for joint taskforce operations. We will better coordinate the development and application of the network information system. To develop a new framework of services and arms, we will speed up the development of strategic deterrence forces and strive to develop new domain forces with new combat capabilities, while making coordinated efforts to strengthen traditional combat forces of the armed police force will be improved.”

Another way of saying there are subtle changes within China’s nuclear strategy.

August

- General Wu Yanan replaced General Wang Xiubin as the Commander of the Southern Theatre Command. General Wu has previously served in Northern, Southern and Central theatres and has changed positions five times since 2020. Find more information about Wu here.

- Meanwhile, China expanded its presence in Antarctica's Southern Ocean by constructing a state-of-the-art building, almost like an ice-bound resort, replete with ocean views and Scandi-style timber furniture. This is not a fancy Antarctic resort, but it is Qinling Station. It is China's fifth Antarctic base and the third capable of operating 12 months a year. China – which has rushed to invest in Antarctica since the 1980s in an effort to catch up with the West — is keenly aware of Antarctica's importance as not just an area rich with fish but also energy. Meanwhile, China also commissioned a new icebreaker vessel, which has been under construction since November 2022. Named Xulong 2 and based out of Qingdao port, this vessel is 122 meters long and has a full load displacement of 5,600 tons. It has a crew of 60 and can stay self-sustained at sea for 80 days. It is able to break through one-meter thick sea-ice at a speed of 2 knots. According to the Chinese North Sea Bureau, a unit under the Ministry of Natural Resources, the ship is equipped with a variety of marine survey equipment and can simultaneously undertake comprehensive observation, investigation and research tasks of the atmosphere, sea ice, three-dimensional water bodies, geophysics and other marine environments. On board is a variety of advanced technology and research equipment, including drones, unmanned ships and underwater autonomous robots. Among them is a heavy-load fuel drone that can carry 250 kilograms of cargo at a time. For more on China's engagement in the Arctic, please read Prof Taylor Fravel, Dr Kathryn Lavelle, and Dr Liselotte Odgaard's paper.

- US President Joe Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Focusing on the China Threat: The White House never announced that Mr Biden had approved the revised strategy, called the "Nuclear Employment Guidance," which also newly seeks to prepare the United States for possible coordinated nuclear challenges from China, Russia and North Korea. The document, updated every four years or so, is so highly classified that there are no electronic copies, only a small number of hard copies distributed to a few national security officials and Pentagon commanders. But in recent speeches, two senior administration officials were allowed to allude to the change — in carefully constrained, single sentences — ahead of a more detailed, unclassified notification to Congress expected before Mr. Biden leaves office... China's nuclear expansion is running at an even faster pace than American intelligence officials anticipated two years ago, driven by President Xi Jinping's determination to scrap the decades-long strategy of maintaining a "minimum deterrent" to reach or exceed the size of Washington's and Moscow's arsenals. China's nuclear complex is now the fastest-growing in the world...The Biden strategy sharpens that focus to reflect the Pentagon's estimates that China's nuclear force would expand to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, roughly the numbers that the United States and Russia now deploy. In fact, Beijing now appears ahead of that schedule; officials say and have begun loading nuclear missiles into new silo fields that were spotted by commercial satellites three years back.

September

- China and India held the 31st Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination Meeting on the India-China Border Affair on August 29, 2024. The Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, Hong Liang China, and Joint Secretary of the East Asia Division of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, Gourangalal Das, co-chaired this meeting. Wen Jiabao first suggested the idea for the WMCC, the then Premier of China, in 2010. The WMCC was established in 2012 to improve institutionalised information exchange on border issues. It also facilitates border area coordination and management, strengthening communication and cooperation between border security personnel. It has been majorly used in the last four years since the border stand-off between India and China in 2020. Until today, 32 meetings have been held between the two countries, the 32nd in December 2024.

- On September 25, 2025, China fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time in 44 years. The test, Beijing's first major missile launch since twin hypersonic weapons tests in the summer of 2021, comes as the PLA is conducting intensive air and naval drills around the region and ahead of a call between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden's meeting. The ICBM carrying a dummy warhead was launched into international waters at 8.44 am, China's defence ministry said, adding that it was a "routine arrangement in our annual training plan" in line with international law and not directed against any country or target. Previously, in July 2021, the PLA launched a rocket that used a "fractional orbital bombardment" system to propel a nuclear-capable "hypersonic glide vehicle" around the Earth for the first time. It held a second hypersonic test the following month.

- Elsewhere, the US, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand conducted military exercises in Manila's exclusive economic zone. The exercises included a Philippine warship, the USS Howard, Japan's JS Sazanami, and New Zealand's HMNZS Aotearoa.

October

- The PLA Navy has loosened the criteria for recruiting pilots for carrier-based aircraft by including young candidates who have received vision correction surgeries. It initiated its pilot election program for the year 2025 in October, recruiting pilot cadets for carrier-based aircraft among high school graduates as well as fresh graduates with bachelor's or master's degrees. There has always been a supply-demand problem in recruiting carrier-based pilots, and the recent loosening of restrictions highlights the problem of talent acquisition within the PLA. This had changed partially during COVID when the armed forces were the major employers in the country.

- Very importantly, India and China agreed to resume patrolling to the “agreed perceived Line of Actual Control,” including in Depsang Plains and Demchok in October 2024. However, there is unlikely to be any immediate thinning down of troops other than those pulled back in the winter, as is the norm. Let’s recap a bit: the first week of May 2020 was when the stand-off began between India and China at the Pangong Lake, and in the same month, the Chinese troops entered the Indian territories and camped at important locations like Hot Springs, Patrol Point 14 and Patrol Point 15. Depsang Plains and Demchok were legacy issues since the early part of this decade. June 15, 2020, is when the Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in a fistfight, resulting in fatalities on both sides. In August 2020, the Indian Army preempted the PLA and occupied strategic heights at the Pangong Lake. In the same week, there were firing, for the first time in 45 years, on the border. January 2021 is when a minor border clash broke out in Naku-La, a different sector of the border conflict. The two sides achieved disengagement at the Pangong Lake region in March 2021. In mid-2022, China and India achieved disengagement in the Gogra and Hotsprings region. In December 2022, a major clash broke out in Yangste in the eastern sector, Arunachal Pradesh, where 300 Chinese troops advanced on the Indian outpost near Chumi Gyatse Fall. In October 2024, the negotiators agreed on patrolling arrangements along the LAC to disengage troops in the Depsang and Demchok areas.

There are buffer zones created at Pangong, Gogra, and Hotsprings. While at Depsang and Demchok, the nature of patrolling is “informed patrolling,” where one side informs the other side before patrolling. It is not an ideal situation, but it’s not a bad situation as well, considering the events that have happened in the past 48 months. Additionally, there has been no de-escalation since the PLA has at least four permanent Combined Armed Brigades in and around the area since 2021.

- Zhang Youxia, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, urged the PLA to boost the construction of the new military training system. In his remarks, Zhang stressed the importance of exploring new models for combined military operations and blazing new trails in raising the combat capabilities of the Chinese military. Zhang also called for efforts to boost the Chinese military's capabilities to conduct joint operations on the basis of the network information system.

- The Philippines accused China's coast guard of firing water cannons at government ships taking supplies to fishermen at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea, but Beijing said its "control measures" followed the boats' intrusions in its waters. This incident happened in the first week of October 2024, a week after the US-led five countries conducted drills in the Philippines' EEZ.

November

- The Washington Post reported that China has invested over USD 50 billion to construct a concentrated build-up of modern military power and a launching point for its aggressive forays into the South China Sea waters. The report added that the PRC had spent billions of dollars converting farm fields and commercial sea ports into military complexes at Hainan, an island roughly Taiwan’s size. Over two decades, the PLA has more than tripled its military infrastructure's value on Hainan and reclaimed reefs in the South China Sea.

- The 2024 China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition, known more commonly as China Airshow or Zhuhai Airshow, was held from November 12 to November 17, 2024, in Zhuhai, a city in the Guangdong province. Highlights: The PRC unveiled its medium-sized multirole stealth fighter by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the J-35. The induction of the J-35A into the PLAAF inventory will make China the second nation, after the US, to field two operational stealth fighters. The 5th generation fighter’s 4th prototype of Russia’s Su-57 also marked its presence at the Zhuhai airshow. The PLA Navy’s brand-new CATOBAR J-15T also wowed spectators on the ground and in the air. Fitted with strengthened landing gear and an AESA, the J-15T is designed for operation on the next-generation Type 003 carrier, the Fujian, and is thus designed to utilise the electromagnetic catapult system. As the PLAN expands and improves its carrier strike capabilities and moves from ski-jump carriers to carriers equipped with catapults, the J-15T will form the core of the PLAN fighter force alongside the highly-anticipated J-35, the naval variant. Another important highlight of the Zhuhai Air show was the debut of the HQ-19 surface-to-air missile system with “ballistic missile intercepting capabilities.” This new generation missile system is an upgrade on the HQ-9 missile system and is reportedly designed for intercepting ballistic missiles (I am not sure in which phase, intermediate or terminal?) The US Defense Department’s annual report on China’s military in 2020 said the HQ-19 interceptor had undergone tests to verify its capability against 3,000 kilometre-range ballistic missiles. So, that means it would be the intermediate phase interceptor. Mounted on an 8x8 high-mobility vehicle, the HQ-19 carries six interceptor missiles and uses a “cold launch” mechanism that reduces the stress on the launcher and allows it to redeploy interceptors rapidly. The Jetank drone also made its debut at the Zhuhai Air Show. A massive mothership drone that can carry a payload of up to six tons, Jetank has a wingspan of 25 meters (82 feet) and a maximum takeoff weight of 16 tons, making it among the largest such weapons in China’s arsenal. The jet-powered attack and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) features eight external hardpoints to carry missiles and bombs, as well as a quickly replaceable mission module that can carry different types of smaller drones. Finally, the air-launched stealth cruise missile CM-98, which was developed by China’s Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Limited and also made its debut at the Zhuhai air show.

- Elsewhere, Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers Dr S Jaishankar and Wang Yi met in Rio, a month after Prime Minister Narendra Modi and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met in Kazan during the BRICS meeting. Here are the Indian and Chinese readouts.

- Finally, there were reports about disciplinary actions against Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun. The Financial Times first reported that Dong was being investigated as part of a wide-ranging anti-corruption probe that has roiled the top ranks of the PLA. However, the Defence Minister reappeared in public in December. While his reappearance suggests Dong is politically safe, it does not mean China will stop its anti-corruption purge against the military.

There are multiple cliques developed in the PLA over its almost 100-year-long history like the security clique, the Shanghai clique, the Fujian clique, the Zhejiang clique, the CCP Central Party School clique, the Shaanxi clique, the Tsinghua clique, the military-industrial clique, and more. But I would keep an eye on the newly emerging Air Force Clique and the Equipment Department Clique (which has been largely purged in the past two years).

- Furthermore, it is reported that China is also probing Admiral Miao Hua, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and director of its political work department.

December

- General Secretary Xi Jinping inspected the newly formed Information Support Force in December 2024. He stressed that it is necessary to implement the new era of strengthening the army, implement the new era of military strategic guidelines, strengthen mission responsibility, be brave in innovation and breakthroughs, consolidate the foundation of the force, strive to build a strong modern information support force, and promote the leapfrog development of our army's network information system.

- Chinese scientists sent a hypersonic aircraft with a remarkably bulky body soaring through the sky, reaching a speed that could cover the distance from Beijing to New York in two hours. During a 2021 test flight first widely publicised this week, a scaled-down prototype of the aircraft reached a top speed of Mach 6.56 – or over six times the speed of sound. The test has provided early validation of a design that, when first unveiled six years ago, was thought to be impossible. The aircraft marks a significant departure from the slender hypersonic vehicles previously seen. It features a fat and round fuselage and cape-shaped wings on its back.

- In the meantime, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the 23rd Special Representatives Meeting of India and China. Simultaneously, the Indian delegation led by Gourangalal Das, Joint Secretary (East Asia), and the Chinese delegation led by Mr. Hong Liang, Director General of the Boundary & Oceanic Affairs Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met under the WMCC framework to discuss next steps for de-escalation on the India-China border.

- The Philippines again held maritime drills with the United States and Japan inside its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea two days after a maritime confrontation with Beijing around a disputed shoal. The drills, which brought together a US Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft, Philippine Navy ship BRP Andres Bonifacio and a C-90 small plane, and Japan's Murasame-class destroyer JS Samidare, are the Philippines' latest round of exercises with allies this year in the face of an increasingly assertive China. Reports indicate that Manila is also considering a potential legal action against China, including sovereignty claims, environmental lawsuits and cases addressing harassment of Philippine vessels.

Check this link to understand broader timeline of China’s Maritime Disputes.

Special Issues:

The People’s Liberation Army Training with AI

It is reported that certain units of the PLA are using Baidu's "Wen Xin Yi Yan" chatbot to train the military's AI system and make military AI more humane. These units use the generative artificial intelligence (AI) chat robot "ERNIE Bot" developed by Baidu, as well as Chinese AI voice recognition, The "Spark Cognitive Large Model," created by iFlytek, a major manufacturer of science and technology, to train the military's AI system to make military AI more humane.

The reports point out that military AI can convert a large amount of sensor data and information reported by frontline troops into descriptive language or images and forward it to the two aforementioned commercial AI models. When they confirm their understanding, the military AI will automatically generate prompts and allow for more in-depth communication on various tasks, such as combat simulations, without human involvement in the entire process.

In 2023, a peer-reviewed paper published in the Chinese academic journal Command Control and Simulation by Sun Yifeng, a project scientist at the PLA University of Information Engineering, highlighted that both humans and machines can benefit from this project. This paper was previously available on the Chinese internet, but the link has now disappeared.

PLA’s Defensive Swarm Tactics

Previously, we read about the PLA’s military exercises that involved aggressive manoeuvres with swarm tactics, especially in Xinjiang, Tibet, and the Gobi desert. But in 2024, the PLA conducted air defence swarm attack training. This is the first time that the PLA is conducting defence against swarm attacks training at such a massive scale. The Western Theatre Command-based PLA’s 77th Group Army, which is responsible for the India contingency, conducted this training on the Tibet plateau at an unknown location. The PLA used anti-artillery guns, man-portable anti-aircraft missiles, Type 95 tanks’ self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, Type 09 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and the Hongqi 17 anti-aircraft missile system against the incoming drone swarms. Notably, only 40 per cent of swarms were destroyed, and the swarm units managed to hit the desired PLA targets accurately.

Expansion of China’s New Type of Militia Force [新型民兵力量体系]

In the past few years, the PLA has attempted to create a new militia force, which it calls the “new type of militia force system.” Under this new system, the PLA, since the COVID-19 outbreak, has attempted to create a new force system which would support the need for future information warfare, domestic emergency response operations, and border warfare. These “new-type militias” (新型民兵) seek to absorb personnel with specialised and professional skills into militia formations to support national defence requirements. The provincial and prefectural level National Defence Mobilisation Offices are responsible for their organisation and training. These NDMOs were formed in 2023 across the country, including Tibet and Xinjiang. For example, the NDMOs in Tibet would possibly be responsible for recruiting Tibetans and employing them for national defence roles in the region. This would imply employing them for specialised roles like border defence, logistic supply, etc. It is still unclear if Tibetans would be employed for more specialised roles relating to information warfare, but since the NDMOs would be training the recruit, it is possible. Furthermore, the militias, through these offices, are also mandated to support theatre commands and military districts during escalation.

The advantages of employing local cadres in areas like Tibet and Xinjiang are that they are already acquainted with the topography and climatic conditions. This accelerates the process of integration. Furthermore, the NDMOs are equipped with multiple responsibilities like national defence mobilisation planning, coordination, reserve personnel, militia management, civil air defence, and supporting border defence operations. So, these new local militia could be trained and employed in multiple operational roles. Finally, the prime focus of this reform is to equip the militia with new warfare skills required for information warfare in informatised conditions.

Hong Kong is the New Tianjin: MCF and Space Warfare

It has recently come to light that at least four or more major universities in Hong Kong are collaborating extensively with the PLA's aerospace and industrial units and academia in their ventures for developing strategic military-civil integration technology, especially in space. It is suspected that Hong Kong is becoming a new base of China's military-civil tech and innovation. It has shifted from Tianjin to Hong Kong in the past 4-5 years, especially after the US sanctions on China under the former Trump administration and ratification.

Reasons: Since we have sanctioned certain conglomerates based in the mainland related to the Chinese military-civil tech, Hong Kong acts as a major transit point for the Chinese Communist Party. For instance, Hong Kong has been repeatedly exposed as a transit point for China's high-tech and military trade in the past few years, especially after the ratification of the National Security Law. No sanctions on Hong Kong-based companies and universities and the National Security Law together give China a free pass to experiment with various technologies, which otherwise would raise suspicion if conducted in the mainland. Additionally, China's state-owned enterprises are too large and easily targeted; private enterprises, along with HK universities, are used to inject innovation into state-owned enterprises. These are the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Joint Sword A, Joint Sword B, and Recent Military Exercises around Taiwan

From what I have read until now, it looks like Joint Sword A and B were more focused on assault on Taiwan, landing capabilities, and Taiwan Invasion scenario; while the recent military exercises in December 2024 focused on emphasising strategic deterrence against outside intervention and an attempt to expand A2/AD capabilities a little beyond the first island chain.

Some Important Articles and Papers that I have Enjoyed Reading in 2024

Estimating China’s Defence Spending: How to Get it Wrong (and Right) - M. Taylor Fravel, George J. Gilboy, Eric Heginbotham
China’s Global Security Initiative at Two: A Journey, not Destiny- M. Taylor Fravel
Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for the US-China Nuclear Relations and International Security – Tong Zhao
China’s Forever War: What if Taiwan Invasion Fails – Joel Wuthnow
More Red but Still Expert: Party-Army Relations Under Xi Jinping – Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders
Hypersonic Weapons Research Collaboration between US and China - Michael Johnson and Matt Bruzzese
Chinese Nuclear Command, Control and Communication - Peter Wood, Alex Stone, and Thomas Corbett
Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024 - Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight
PLA Rocket Force Organisation - Ma Xiu
Encounters and Escalation in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives on China’s Military and Implications for Regional Security – Edited by Oriana Mastro
When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Adversary Perceptions of Nuclear No-First-Use Pledges - Caitlin Talmadge, Lisa Michelini, Vipin Narang
Nuclear Posture and Nuclear Posturing: A Conceptual Framework of Analysing China’s Nuclear Weapons Policy - Christopher A. Ford

Books that I Look Forward to Reading in 2025

Crosswinds: (Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competion over China): Vijay Gokhale
Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information-Age Weapons in International Security: Fiona Cunningham
Upstart: How China became a Great Power: Oriana Skylar Mastro
China’s Quest for Military Supremacy: Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders
China’s Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion: Ketian Zhang

Suyash Desai is a research scholar studying China’s defence and foreign policies. He is currently studying Mandarin at National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU), Taipei, Taiwan. He can be reached at @suyash_desai.

Website: www.suyashdesai.com

The PLA Bulletin